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INTRODUCTION
The euro is a rather unusual currency as it is shared by a union of largely inde-
pendent states. This results in a single supranational monetary union, while
most ‘economic’ matters are decided on a national level. A key challenge in such
a system is to ensure that the different levels of decision-making do not under-
mine the advantages of the common currency. For this reason, the European
monetary union has been buttressed by economic integration, resulting in the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
From a mere organizational perspective, one could argue that it would have
been better to transfer economic decision-making to the level of the EU. How-
ever, this was politically unviable and deemed unnecessary, even by the Euro-
pean Commission1. Instead, policy-makers opted for a system in which national
fiscal and economic policies would be supervised and coordinated at the EU
level. This system is referred to as European economic governance2.
Ever since the design of the single currency, there have been serious doubts on
its sustainability. The question was raised whether quasi-autonomous fiscal and
economic policies could be compatible with a single currency. The sovereign
debt crisis that hit the eurozone in 2010 has indeed vividly demonstrated the
insufficiency of existing European economic governance. Despite the provisions
in place, several eurozone countries’ public finances deteriorated to the point
where markets began to question these countries’ basic financial sustainability.
Faced with the shortcomings of European economic governance, the EU needed
to respond. The EU chose not to pursue fundamental changes such as a closer
political union or the break up of its monetary union. Instead, it opted to reform
its economic governance framework. Up until June 2011, legislative negotia-
tions took place. While a final agreement was not reached yet, the most impor-
tant outlines of the reform of economic governance had become clear. This
paper discusses this reform.
The paper begins by considering the need for economic governance (§ 1). Sub-
sequently, economic governance before the sovereign debt crisis is discussed
(§ 2). Economic governance, as it was, failed to avert the sovereign debt crisis
1. Commission of the European Communities, Economic and Monetary Union, 21 August 1990, SEC
(90) 1659 final
2. While there is no common definition of the concept, European economic governance can be described
as the European economic policy-making with the institutions, machinery and practices that aims to
shape the evolution of the European economy. See: BEGG, I, Economic governance in an enlarged euro
area, European Economy. European Commission Economic Papers, 311, 2008, p. 5.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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(§ 3). This crisis proved to require a European response (§ 4) and laid bare sev-
eral of Europe’s economic governance shortcomings (§  5). The subsequent
reform of economic governance comprises two key components. On the one
hand, legislative reforms aim at reforming existing economic governance (§ 6).
On the other hand, crisis governance is being developed, which is to step in
when a eurozone country faces severe financial difficulties (§ 7). Finally, a con-
clusion is provided.
Stijn VERHELST3
3. The author is Research Fellow at Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations. He thanks
Professor Franklin Dehousse for the inspiring comments.5
1. THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN 
A MONETARY UNION
A monetary union without proper economic coordination is doomed to fail.
This has been clear from the onset of the European project. In 1970, the Werner
report already called for the simultaneous creation of an economic and mone-
tary union4. This message was frequently reiterated5.
In the EU, technological progress and the single market had already integrated
the Member States’ economies to a great extent. The creation of a monetary
union implied a subsequent, qualitative leap in the interdependence of eurozone
countries. The monetary union fixes the countries’ exchange rates and requires
a unified monetary policy. Both of these crucial variables are then determined by
the collective performance of the monetary union’s members6.
The members of the eurozone have thus become vitally dependent on each
other’s economic and fiscal performances. This mutual dependence implies that
a policy in one eurozone country can easily influence the other members of the
currency union. Such dependence has both positive and negative consequences.
On the one hand, eurozone members reap the fruit of other members’ successes.
On the other hand, they have to share the burden of each other’s downturns, as
has occurred during the sovereign debt crisis.
A monetary union also makes it impossible for individual members to use mon-
etary policies as a way to overcome their difficulties. Before the monetary union
was established, loss of confidence in a country’s economic or fiscal situation
resulted in a depreciation of that country’s currency. This implied an increase in
competitiveness and a lessening of fiscal pressure. In case of severe problems, a
devaluation of the currency could be applied. Both instruments have become
unavailable to eurozone countries7. Therefore, a crisis in a eurozone country
cannot be resolved as easily as in a country that is not a member of a monetary
union. The crisis furthermore affects the other eurozone countries. This, again,
calls for solid European economic governance.
4. Report on the realisation by stages of economic and monetary union. “Werner Report”, 8 October
1970, In: Bulletin of the European Communities, No Supplement 11/70, 1970, pp. 5-29.
5. See for example: European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Hanover, 27-28 June 1988; Delors Com-
mittee, Report on economic and monetary union in the European Community, 17 April 1989 and Com-
mission of the European Communities, Economic and Monetary Union, op. cit. footnote 1.
6. JAMET, J-F., Un gouvernement économique européen: du slogan à la réalité?, Questions d’Europa, nr.
167-168, Fondation Robert Schuman, 26 avril 2010.
7. DE GRAUWE, P., The Governance of A Fragile Eurozone, Discussion Paper, 2011, retrievable at: http:/
/www.econ.kuleuven.be/ew/academic/intecon/Degrauwe/PDG-papers/Discussion_papers/Governance-
fragile-eurozone_s.pdf7
2. ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE UP TO 
THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
The interdependence between Member States and especially between eurozone
countries had resulted in an economic governance framework, with a range of
rules and coordination mechanisms. Yet, economic integration was rather lim-
ited, as decision-making was left at the level of the Member States.
In the first place, a set of European fiscal rules has been adopted (2.1). Secondly,
a looser system of macro-economic policy surveillance and coordination was set
up to achieve converging economic growth (2.1). As will become clear, the vast
majority of pre-sovereign debt crisis governance applied to all EU Member
States. Due to the continued difference in membership between the EU and the
eurozone, as well as the need for closer eurozone cooperation, policy-makers
nevertheless adopted a limited number instruments specific to the eurozone (2.3).
2.1. Fiscal Rules
Rules meant to ensure robust public finances were the cornerstone of the former
economic governance set-up. The design of the economic arm of EMU reflects a
deep-rooted fear that the problematic fiscal position of one Member State could
deteriorate the economic, fiscal and monetary conditions of other Member States.
The EU level has not, however, been attributed major fiscal policy competences,
as Member States largely remain in control of fiscal policies. A rule-based sys-
tem has been adopted, which aims to ensure fiscal discipline and avoid negative
spillover effects in case fiscal discipline is not achieved.
2.1.1. Rules to Ensure Fiscal Discipline
The Treaty’s Excessive Deficit Procedure8 and the Stability and Growth Pact9,
which complements and details the former, are the main legal instruments to
8. Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, pp. 47-388,
hereinafter TFEU.
9. The political basis for the Stability and Growth Pact was established by the Resolution of the European
Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, Amsterdam, 17 June 1997. The Pact was defined by Council
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary posi-
tions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1-5; Council
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure, OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6-11. It was modified in 2005; see Council Regulation
(EC) No 1055/2005 and Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005, both of 27 June 2005.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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achieve EU-wide fiscal discipline. These legal instruments put in place a surveil-
lance mechanism that can result in corrective measures if needed. After a failed
attempt to use these corrective measures, the Stability and Growth Pact was
revised in 2005. In the eyes of many, this led to less stringent rules10.
The Treaty provides two main indicators to evaluate the budgetary situations of
Member States. On the one hand, there is the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Debt is
not to exceed 60%, or should diminish at a sufficient pace. On the other hand,
the government deficit-to-GDP ratio is to be no more than 3%. A failure to meet
these indicators can only be justified in case of exceptional circumstances11.
The Stability and Growth Pact introduces medium-term budgetary objectives.
The Pact stipulated in its original version that Member States’ budgets need to
be in balance or in surplus in the medium term. The 2005 revision somewhat
diluted this requirement, by allowing differentiated Member State objectives,
which can range from a budget deficit of 1% of GDP to a budget in surplus.
With the Stability and Growth Pact, attention shifts almost exclusively to the
budgetary deficits. Public debt was sidelined, as it became one of the multiple
medium-term evolutions to be taken into account, besides for example retire-
ment costs and public investments.
In order to verify whether Member States adhere to the fiscal rules, a surveil-
lance procedure has been put in place. Every year, eurozone countries have to
submit a Stability Programme detailing their budget of that year12. These Pro-
grammes are subsequently evaluated by the Commission. Based on the Stability
Programmes and its own surveillance, the Commission provides an assessment
of the Member States’ fiscal positions. If it believes that a Member State has an
excessive deficit, it can address an opinion on the matter to the Council – after
drawing up an initial report and obtaining the opinion of the Economic and
Financial Committee. From that moment on, the Council holds the key to
ensure the implementation of the fiscal discipline rules.
Subsequent to the opinion of the Commission on an excessive deficit in a Mem-
ber State, the Council is to make an overall evaluation of that Member States’
budgetary situation. The general nature of this evaluation gives the Council con-
siderable leeway. Based on its evaluation, the Council is to decide whether or not
the Member State has an excessive deficit. This decision is to be made by a
qualified majority. The Lisbon Treaty brought about a minor change, as the
10. For example: MORRIS, R., ONGENA, H., SCHUKNECHT, L., The Reform and Implementation of
the Stability and Growth Pact, Occasional Paper Series, European Central Bank, No. 47, June 2006.
11. Article 1 of Protocol No 12 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, TFEU.
12. Non-eurozone Member States’ programmes are referred to as Convergence Programmes.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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Member State in question is no longer allowed to vote on whether or not it has
an excessive deficit. If the Council finds a Member State to be in an excessive
deficit, it is to recommend actions to correct this deficit.
As a very last resort, after giving additional notice and a deadline, the Council
can impose sanctions if a Member States has not taken sufficient action to
reduce its deficit. Such a decision needed to be made on the basis of a qualified
majority. The Stability Pact provided that an initial sanction consists of a non-
interest bearing deposit of between 0.2% and 0.5% of a Member State’s GDP,
depending on the severity of the excessive deficit. When the Member State in
question returned to a healthy fiscal situation, the deposit would be reimbursed.
If the excessive deficit remained uncorrected two years after the deposit was
made, the deposit would be converted into a fine.
Originally, the procedure, from a Member States’ first reporting to a first poten-
tial sanction was to take ten months. This was prolonged to 16 months in
200513. The European Court of Justice, for its part, has indicated that the Coun-
cil could prolong this procedure even further by not taking a decision14.
2.1.2. Avoidance of Negative Spillovers
It seems as though Member States were aware from the start that the aforemen-
tioned fiscal discipline rules were all but foolproof. Therefore, the Treaty con-
tains a set of rules that aim to prevent inadequate fiscal discipline in a Member
State from producing spillover effects in other Member States.
A set of rules was put in place that needed to ensure that Member States’ fiscal
difficulties would not result in higher inflation or affect the common monetary
policy. These rules prohibit central bank credit facilities for Member states15,
direct sovereign debt purchasing by central banks16, as well as privileged access
to financial institutions for the EU or Member States17.
The Treaty equally provides that a Member State is solely responsible for its
debt, so as to confine fiscal problems to that Member State. This is enshrined in
the Treaty’s no bailout clause18. The name of this clause can be somewhat mis-
13. See Recital 15 and Article 7 of Council Regulation No 1467/97, op. cit. footnote 7.
14. Case C-27/04, 13 July 2004, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European
Union, European Court Reports, 2004, p. I-6649.
15. Article 123 TFEU.
16. Ibid.
17. Article 124 of ibid.
18. Article 125(2) of ibid.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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leading, as it does not imply a complete ban on financial aid. Rather, it states
that neither the Union, nor the Member States are to be liable for or assume the
commitments of another Member State. Thus, debt of an EU Member State
cannot be passed on to other Member States, nor can other Member States be
held accountable for it.
This no bailout clause is meant to avoid moral hazard, i.e. the drive towards
imprudent fiscal policies. The idea is that without such a clause, the eurozone
would provide implicit insurance against fiscal difficulties in a eurozone coun-
try. Such insurance would imply that the eurozone would provide assistance to
a Member State that faces a fiscal crisis. This, in turn, could lead to imprudent
fiscal behaviour by eurozone countries and a lack of financial market vigilance.
Less fiscal discipline would therefore be rewarded, with adverse effects for the
monetary union as a whole19.
2.2. Macro-economic Policy Coordination
Besides the fiscal rules, a range of economic policy coordination mechanisms has
also been put in place – as required by the Treaty20. The goals of these instru-
ments are to work towards converging economic policies and performances, as
well as to foster economic growth in general. To achieve these goals, the Council
is to monitor the economic developments of each Member State and coordinate
national economic policies21.
The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) are designed as a main instru-
ment for macro-economic policy coordination22. These Guidelines contain gen-
eral macro-economic objectives, as well as policy recommendations to achieve
these goals. The Council adopts the BEPGs, after a recommendation from the
Commission and discussion by the Heads of State or Government. The Council
subsequently monitors the consistency of national polices with these BEPGs, in
addition to monitoring economic developments in general. On the basis of its
work, the Council can issue recommendations when it believes that a country’s
policies are contrary to the common European interest. The Commission has the
19. See: BEETSMA, R. BOVENBERG, A, The Optimality of a Monetary Union Without a Fiscal Union,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 33, No. 2, May, 2001, pp. 179-204.
20. The need to coordinate economic policies has been enshrined in Article 5 TFEU.
21. Article 121(3) TFEU.
22. These Broad Economic Policy Guidelines were first published in 1993 and were followed by subse-
quent ones.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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power to issue warnings23. The BEPGs, the Council recommendations and the
Commission warnings are nevertheless not legally binding24.
Besides the BEPGs, the European Employment Strategy plays a significant role
in macro-economic policy coordination. This Strategy aims to coordinate the
employment policies of the EU Member States. Similar to the BEPGs, the Euro-
pean Employment Strategy comprises a set of guidelines for Member States’
employment policies. The Open Method of Coordination, which is a non-bind-
ing benchmarking and peer review instrument, was used to evaluate national
policies. If required, the Council can make non-binding recommendations25.
The Lisbon Strategy26 supplemented and partly unified these two surveillance
and coordination instruments. It also increased the political importance of eco-
nomic coordination, as the European Council played a key role in the process.
The Lisbon Strategy led to the integration of the BEPGs and the European
Employment Strategy into so-called Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs.
Member States are to adopt multi-annual National Reform Programmes that
aim to implement these Integrated Guidelines. Meanwhile, the Lisbon Strategy
has been succeeded by the EU 2020 Strategy27. The EU 2020 Strategy differs in
some aspects from the Lisbon Strategy, but it remains non-binding and contin-
ues to focus on structural reforms.
The BEPGs, the European Employment Strategy and the EU 2020 Strategy all
focus mainly on obtaining stated ‘positive’ goals. In doing so, they paid less
attention to divergence in Member States’ macro-economic performance. Criti-
cism of laggards has been rather soft28. Furthermore, the non-binding nature of
the instruments clearly differentiated macro-economic policy coordination from
the stricter fiscal rules. The EU’s potential to influence macro-economic policies
was more limited as a consequence29.
23. Article 121 TFEU.
24. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union explicitly states that Recommendations do not
have binding force (see Article 288 TFEU). Furthermore, Article 121(2) TFEU contains no provisions to
make the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, nor the Commission warnings legally binding.
25. Article 148 TFEU.
26. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon, 23 and 24 March 2000.
27. European Commission, Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, 3
March 2010, COM(2010) 2020 final.
28. DEROOSE, S., HODSON, D., KUHLMANN, J., The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines: Before and
after the Re-Launch of the Lisbon Strategy, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 4, 2008,
p. 838.
29. BEGG, I, Economic governance in an enlarged euro area, European Economy. European Commission
Economic Papers, 311, 2008, pp. 8-12.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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2.3. Limited Additional Eurozone Specific 
Governance
The aforementioned elements of European economic governance, i.e. fiscal rules
and macro-economic policy coordination, concern all EU Member States. This
is understandable if you take into account that – in theory – Member States have
to adopt the euro once they adhere to the so-called convergence criteria30. How-
ever, due to EU enlargements, the opt-outs of the UK and Denmark31 and the de
facto opt-out of Sweden32, many Member States continue to use a currency
other than the euro33. Despite the fact that most of these countries will eventu-
ally join the eurozone, this asymmetry will persevere for some time.
In view of this asymmetry and their increased interdependence, eurozone coun-
tries decided to step-up economic governance inside the eurozone. An important
step has been the creation of a eurozone-specific body: the Euro Group34. The
Group normally consists of the eurozone’s finance ministers, the ECB President
and the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs35. It is not meant to
replace Council meetings, but serves as an informal body. The Group’s task is to
perform surveillance of the eurozone, as well as discuss issues related to the
zone’s proper functioning. Eurozone ministers can also take measures regarding
budgetary discipline and economic policy guidelines36. The Euro Group de facto
decides on the initiation and continuation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure of
eurozone countries, as well as their progress in meeting the policy guidelines.
Besides the Euro Group’s role in economic governance, some additional eco-
nomic governance instruments have been put in place for eurozone countries.
These concern both fiscal discipline and macro-economic coordination. With
regard to the fiscal discipline, eurozone countries must conduct mid-term budget
reviews providing guidance for the coming year’s budget exercise. As concerns
macro-economic policy coordination, the BEPGs contain eurozone specific pol-
30. See Article 140 TFEU.
31. Protocol 15 on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land and Protocol 16 on certain provisions relating to Denmark, both annexed to TFEU.
32. Sweden has no official opt-out, but is not eager to join the eurozone. The country is not obliged to do
so, as it isn’t part of the ERM II (European Exchange Rate Mechanism II). Commission officials have
indicated that it is up Sweden to decide whether it will join the euro. See: European Parliament, Verbatim
of the hearing of Olli Rehn Commissioner-Designate Economic and Monetary Affairs, 11 January 2010.
33. As of 2011, 17 EU Member States have adopted the euro while 10 other Member States still use their
own national currency.
34. Protocol No 14 on the Euro Group, TFEU.
35. Legal provisions do however not indicate which ministers shall be present at these meetings. This
could thus be the Heads of State and Government. During the sovereign debt crisis, Heads of State and
Government indeed held Euro Group summits.
36. Article 136 TFEU.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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icy guidelines37. In addition, eurozone countries must conduct broad economic
surveillance of the eurozone as such38.
Despite the Euro Group and eurozone-specific instruments, it is clear that most
of the economic governance of the monetary union concerned the EU as a
whole. This is in contrast with the closer interdependence of the eurozone coun-
tries.
37. These have been introduced in 2000 and became a eurozone specific chapter in subsequent BEPGs.
38. Council of the European Union, The Eurogroup – Policies, retrievable on: http://consilium.europa.eu/
showPage.aspx?id=1827&lang=en15
3. THE EUROZONE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
In the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis, the eurozone was con-
fronted with a sovereign debt crisis from 2010 onwards. What first started out
as a problem in one Member State, Greece, quickly developed into a crisis that
affected important parts of the eurozone. The very future of the monetary union
was put into question.
The crisis was for the most part due to the sharp deterioration of public finances
(3.1). The result was increased market anxiety (3.2). This in turn led to a rise in
public borrowing costs of some eurozone countries (3.3). As a consequence,
these countries’ public finances worsened even further, which in the end required
assistance by the EU (see the next chapter). Notwithstanding these efforts, prob-
lems remain and a restructuring of public debt of one or more eurozone coun-
tries has become probable (3.4).
3.1. Deteriorating Public Finances
The economic and financial crisis that preceded the sovereign debt crisis led to
a severe recession. Due to this economic downturn, tax revenue fell, while public
spending increased. As a result, public deficit soared. From 2009 to 2012, euro-
zone countries are forecast to have annual budget deficits of over 5% of GDP
on average39. As a consequence, average eurozone public debt will increase sub-
stantially, from 66% of GDP in 2007, to almost 88% of GDP in 2012. Such
large and continual budget deficits and subsequent increasing debt have put
pressure on the sustainability of public finances.
Greece’s public finances, and its lack of credibility, proved the most worrying.
At the end of 2009, Greece had to admit, once again, that its previous budgetary
forecasts significantly underestimated the country’s budget deficit. In January
2009, it had reported an envisaged 2009 budget deficit of 3.7% of GDP, while
this figure was revised to 12.5% that same year40. As a result of the mistrust and
aggravation of Greece’s financial position, the world’s three main credit rating
agencies all downgraded Greece’s rating41.
Ireland proved to be another weak link. Ireland had been the first eurozone
39. The average eurozone deficit is forecasted to be 6.3% in 2009, 6.3% in 2010, 4.6% in 2011 and
3.9% in 2012. See European Commission, European Economic Forecast, autumn 2010.
40. European Commission, European Economic Forecast – autumn 2009, 2009, pp.93-94. The budget
deficit was afterwards even revised upwards to 15.4%.
41. In December 2009 Fitch, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s downgraded Greece’s public debt rating.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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country to substantially feel the consequence of the financial crisis. Its housing
market and financial sector, both exceptionally large, contracted considerably.
The result was a sharp deterioration of the countries’ fiscal position. In Septem-
ber 2010, the Irish government announced a comprehensive package to support
its financial institutions. The package is worth around 20% of GDP and
increased public deficit to 32% of GDP42.
The economic downturn has also put pressure on the other eurozone countries’
finances. Especially countries like Portugal and Spain run high deficits and have
weak economic growth prospects. As a consequence, their public finances have
deteriorated tremendously.
3.2. Financial Market Anxiety
The continued deterioration of public finances and weak growth prospects in
some eurozone countries have led analysts to doubt on these countries’ basic
financial health. Their ability to finance expenses in the long term, i.e. their
solvency, has consequentially been put into question. The doubts made markets
nervous. The nervousness was further compounded by other factors, related to
the previous economic and financial crisis and to the eurozone’s ability to cope
with its internal difficulties.
The financial and economic crisis resulted in severe losses for investors. As a
consequence, investors became averse to risk, avoiding any potential new losses.
Investors tended to respond quickly and massively to signs of problems, includ-
ing the state of public finances. The financial and economic crisis resulted in a
highly fragile financial sector – and to make matters worse, financial institutions
owned an important amount of public debt. Repayment problems in eurozone
countries would therefore put the financial sector under great stress43. Conse-
quently, investors began to mistrust banks that held large amounts of the public
debt of countries with deteriorated public finances.
Another important reason for market anxiety was the low level of confidence in
the ability of the eurozone to deal with its internal problems. Both the willing-
42. LENIHAN, B., Minister’s Statement on Banking, Irish Department of Finance, 30 September 2010,
ttp://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=6515&CatID=1&StartDate=1+January+2011&m=
43. Financial institutions in the eurozone own a large part of the debt of the euro area countries facing
market pressures. At the end of 2009, eurozone banks’ foreign exposure to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain was USD 727 billion. The eurozone banks’ foreign exposure to the public sector of these countries
amounts to USD 254 billion. See: AVDJIEV, S., UPPER, C., VON KLEIST, K., Highlights of international
banking and financial market activity, BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, June
2010, pp. 19-21.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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ness of the eurozone countries to deal with the problems of certain of its fellow
members, as well as the basic soundness of the eurozone’s set-up was ques-
tioned. Financial markets feared that the monetary union would render it excep-
tionally difficult for a Member State to overcome its difficulties.
3.3. A Surge in the Cost of Public Borrowing
The loss of confidence in Greece’s ability to overcome its difficulties, as well as
the general market anxiety, resulted in sharply increasing interest rates charged
for the country’s public debt. In May 2010, interest rates of 10-year Greek
bonds had risen to well above 12%, which was more than 8 percentage points
higher than 7 months before44. Afterwards, it further increased to more than
16% in June 2011.
The anxiety about the state of public finances subsequently spread to other
eurozone countries. Countries whose fundamentals were judged weak, such as
Ireland, Portugal and Spain saw the market interest rates of their public bonds
increase considerably. Other countries with specific issues equally saw a rise in
interest rates. The rising cost of borrowing for these countries only aggravated
their already dire fiscal situations. For several eurozone countries it proved
unfeasible to access the financial markets at affordable rates. The evolution of
sovereign debt interest rates is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Interest rates 10-year sovereign debt of selected eurozone countries45
44. The 10-year Greek government bond yields rose from 4.32% on 7 October 2009 to 12.63% on 7
May 2010. This implies an increase 831 basis points in 7 months (source: Thomson Reuters).
45. Source: Bloomberg.
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Several eurozone countries thus feel the consequences of the eurozone sovereign
debt crisis. Yet, the crisis does not appear to affect the eurozone as a whole in a
major way. While the euro had initially seen a decrease in its exchange rate vis-
à-vis the US dollar, it has since regained its strength46. This signals that a euro-
zone-wide crisis was avoided.
3.4. A Restructuring of Public Debt
As was mentioned above, the fiscal situation of some eurozone countries has
become worrying. Many economists doubt whether fiscal consolidation is fea-
sible for Greece and, to a lesser extent, for other troubled eurozone countries47.
Several state that debt restructuring is necessary to alleviate Greece’s debt bur-
den.
Such debt restructuring would take place by means of one or more of the fol-
lowing measures: (1) lowering the interest rate received on public debt;
(2) extending the maturity of the debt, i.e. spreading debt repayments over a
longer period; or (3) reducing the nominal value of the bond, which is to be
reimbursed to the bond holder at the final payment date.
Arguably more important is the nature of the debt restructuring. Restructuring
can take place on a voluntary basis, or it can be unilaterally imposed by the
country on its creditors. Voluntary debt restructuring implies that a country pro-
poses bondholders a restructuring of their debt (in practice, such proposals
would be made in consultation with major debt holders). On the basis of these
proposals, debt holders can choose to agree to a restructuring of their debt. By
agreeing to such debt restructuring, debt holders agree to receive less returns
than originally foreseen. This represents a cost for investors. Yet, they simulta-
neously become more certain of receiving the remaining part of their invest-
ment48.
In the case of unilateral debt restructuring, the country imposes a restructuring
of its debt upon the government debt holders. In this case, the debt holders have
no choice but to accept the conditions. The possibility of unilateral debt restruc-
46. In early December 2009, the euro-dollar exchange rate was close to 1.5. In June 2010, that rate had
dropped to 1.2 (a decrease of 20%). Since, the euro has regained in strength compared to the US dollar. In
June 2011, 1 euro valued approximately 1.45 US dollar.
47. See for example: DARVAS, Z., PISANI-FERRY, J., SAPIR, A., A Comprehensive Approach to the
Euro-Area Debt Crisis, Bruegel Policy Brief, Issue 2011/02, February 2011, p. 4.
48. KOPF, C., Restoring financial stability in the euro area, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 237, 15 March 2011,
pp. 16-20.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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turing depends on the applicable law and the contractual provisions of the pub-
lic debt. With regard to most Greek public bonds, neither the applicable Greek
law, nor the bonds themselves contain provisions that seem to prevent unilateral
debt restructuring49.
This second way of restructuring is, of course, much more disruptive and would
undermine investor confidence the most. Yet, it can result in a more profound
reduction of the country’s debt burden. In case of voluntary debt restructuring,
the country cannot be sure that a large enough number of debt holders will agree
to the proposed terms. Furthermore, a voluntary restructuring of debt would
most likely result in a mild restructuring, such as a lengthening of maturities.
Yet, it is doubtful whether this would be sufficient. Economists argue that in
order for Greek debt to become sustainable, a restructuring would have to
reduce the value of Greek debt (i.e. a haircut) by at least 20%, while figures of
30% to 50% are seen as more realistic50.
Although debt restructuring can have a positive effect on Greece’s fiscal sustain-
ability, it also entails substantial risks. Debt restructuring would entail costs for
investors and notably the financial sector in Greece and elsewhere, the EU and
its Member States. The European Central Bank (ECB) would feel the conse-
quences as well, as it owns considerable amounts of Greek debt. If badly man-
aged, debt restructuring could therefore result in a new phase of the eurozone
debt crisis. Nonetheless, it would be erroneous to simply disregard this option.
49. BUCHHEIT, L., GULATI, M., How to Restructure Greek Debt, Duke Law Working Papers. Paper 47,
2010, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/working_papers/47
50. ROUBINI et al. calculate that a 20% haircut is needed to reduce Greek debt to 60% of GDP by 2030,
based on optimistic figures. A 50% haircut would be needed based on more conservative macro-economic
forecasts. According to Citi Investment Research & Analysis, a 29% haircut is needed to bring debt to
120% of GDP in 2013, while 52% is needed to bring debt to 90% of GDP by 2013. Finally, DARVAS et
al. believe a 30% haircut is needed to bring Greece’s debt to 60% of GDP by 2034. See respectively:
ROUBINI, N., et al., A How-To Manual for Plan B: Options for Restructuring Greek Public Debt, Rou-
bini Global Economics Analysis, 9 May 2011, p.5; NEDIALKOV, S., et al., Hellenic Banks. Fancy a Hair-
cut?, Citi Investment Research & Analysis, 20 April 2011, p.11; DARVAS, Z. et al., op. cit. footnote 44,
p. 4.21
4. THE EU’S RESPONSE TO THE SOVEREIGN 
DEBT CRISIS
While Greece’s problems started in late 2009, it took considerable time before
there was an EU response to the burgeoning sovereign debt crisis. The EU is
generally slow in its decision-making, while disagreements within and between
Member States caused additional delay. Furthermore, the EU was not prepared
for a sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone since policy-makers had thought that
preparing for such a response could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy (see 2.1.2).
Yet, as the crisis in Greece aggravated and spread to other eurozone countries,
an EU reaction proved more and more inevitable.
The EU’s eventual reaction essentially consisted of three parts. In the first place,
it tried to calm the financial markets (4.1). When this reaction alone proved
insufficient, the EU addressed the consequences of the crisis by providing finan-
cial assistance to the most troubled countries (4.2). Finally, in addition to these
two short term reactions, the EU has started to address a major cause of the
crisis: the flawed design of European economic governance (4.3).
4.1. Trying to Calm the Financial Markets
The increase in interest rates charged for sovereign debt was caused by doubts
in the markets on the ability of some eurozone countries to reimburse their debt.
The initial reaction by the EU and its Member States therefore consisted of try-
ing to calm financial markets.
Policy-makers laboured to convince the financial markets that all eurozone
countries would be able to meet their financial obligations. Greece and other
Member States committed to comprehensive austerity measures in order to cut
their budget deficits. EU declarations, for their part, stressed the significance of
efforts that were undertaken by these countries.
The EU also downplayed possible cascade consequences of a eurozone country’s
inability to meet its financial obligations. To this purpose, a bank stress test was
conducted and its results were published in the summer of 2010. The subsequent
problems in the Irish financial sector have nonetheless shown that the stress test
did not disclose the actual health of European banks51.
51. Analysts found the stress test to be insufficient. The simulated stress was considered too weak, as it
did not involve a sovereign default scenario. Furthermore, the stress test only focussed on the solvency of
financial institutions. Their liquidity was not examined. Finally, the stress test only tested the resilience of
91 banks. See: Committee of European Banking Supervisors, Aggregate outcome of the 2010 EU wide
stress test exercise coordinated by CEBS in cooperation with the ECB, 23 July 2010, http://stress-test.c-
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As a way to demonstrate their resolve to tackle the issue, EU leaders indicated
that they were committed to deal with any threat to the monetary union. During
the European Council of February 2010, the Heads of State or Government of
the eurozone declared that they  would “take determined and coordinated
action, if needed, to safeguard financial stability in the euro area as a whole”.
They failed, however, to provide any specifics as to what kind of actions they
envisaged. As a consequence, investors were left with much uncertainty and the
borrowing costs for Greece continued to increase. The lack of precision in future
declarations often had a similar effect.
An alternative to calming financial markets was not to reduce anxiety in these
markets, but to limit mechanisms that can lead to sharp, negative market evolu-
tions. Speculators were the main target, as they are considered to unduly aggra-
vate interest hikes. EU rules on the matter have been proposed52, while Germany
had unilaterally prohibited certain speculative strategies53. Actions to reduce the
influence of the Anglo-Saxon credit rating agencies were equally considered54.
4.2. Providing Financial Assistance
Efforts to appease the market were not very successful and it became very costly
for Greece and, subsequently, other countries to finance themselves on the finan-
cial markets. After much discussion, eurozone leaders finally agreed to offer
financial assistance to eurozone countries that required it. After an initial ad-hoc
financial assistance package for Greece, a temporary lending mechanism appli-
cable to the entire eurozone was put in place. Meanwhile, the ECB provided
more discrete financial assistance to troubled eurozone countries.
While the financial assistance has aided troubled eurozone countries in the short
run, some doubt whether it is beneficial in the long run. As financial assistance
tries to solve the debt crisis by taking on more debt, it could result in a larger
future crisis55. However, as the alternatives to not providing financial assistance
52. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Short Selling and certain aspects of Credit
Default Swaps, 15 September 2010, COM(2010) 482.
53. See: General Decrees of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) of 18 May 2010. These
Decrees were revoked on 27 July 2010.
54. The link between capital requirements for financial institutions and credit ratings was questioned and
the idea of creating a European credit rating agency was floated; see: European Commission, Public Con-
sultation on Credit Rating Agencies, 5 November 2010, retrievable on: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_mar-
ket/consultations/docs/2010/cra/cpaper_en.pdf
55. DENNINGER, K., Solving a Sovereign Debt Crisis by Issuing More of the Same, Seeking Alpha, May
10, 2010, http://seekingalpha.com/article/204065-solving-a-sovereign-debt-crisis-by-issuing-more-of-the-
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seemed even more detrimental, such assistance seems a reasonable short term
response.
4.2.1. Ad-hoc Assistance to Greece
In March 2010, eurozone leaders agreed on providing bilateral loans to Greece
if market financing was insufficient. More concrete steps towards a rescue plan
for Greece were agreed upon in April 2010, as Eurozone finance ministers
agreed to offer a financial assistance programme for Greece.
The Greek rescue package was finally elaborated and implemented in May
2010, against a backdrop of soaring Greek government bond yields. Greece is
provided with loans worth EUR 80 billion. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) provides an extra EUR 30 billion, resulting in a total rescue package of
EUR 110 billion56. This package (as well other the subsequent packages, see
infra) is provided in several tranches. The disbursement of each tranche depends
on the progress of Greek reforms.
The ad-hoc financial assistance will most likely be replaced by a longer-term
assistance package. This assistance package will be financed by the temporary
financial assistance facility (see infra).
4.2.2. The Temporary Financial Assistance Facility
After the Greek ad-hoc lending, a temporary financial assistance facility stepped
in. The facility will expire in 201357. Its original goal was to dispel worries
about eurozone countries’ finances and was meant not to be used. It seems,
however, that this rescue package was agreed upon too late. Financial markets
remained worried over Greece’s public finances and worries about the sound-
ness of public finances spread to other peripheral eurozone countries and finan-
cial institutions.
a. Design
As a headline figure, the rescue mechanism is worth EUR 750 billion, although
the actual financial assistance capacity had been much lower. The rescue mech-
56. Eurogroup, Statement by the Eurogroup, 2 May 2010.
57. The EFSF (see infra) will formally continue to operate beyond 2013 for as long as Member States
reimburse the loans they received. The EFSF will, however, no longer be able to provide new financial
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anism is massive, representing more than 8% of eurozone GDP58. It consists of
three components, namely:
￿ Financial assistance provided by the Commission, dubbed the European
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM). This assistance is backed by the
EU budget and, thus, all Member States. It has a lending power of EUR 60
billion.
￿ The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), backed by the eurozone
members. The EFSF can borrow up to EUR 440 billion.
￿ IMF assistance. IMF financing is to add at least half of the amount provided
by the Commission and eurozone assistance.
The EFSF is clearly the most important part of the rescue package. It is also the
most complicated. The EFSF is a separate legal vehicle, set up as a private entity
under Luxemburg law. Although the EFSF can borrow up to EUR 440 billion,
its lending capacity is more limited.
The difference between the EFSF’s borrowing and lending capacity is due to the
eurozone countries’ desire to obtain the best possible credit rating (a triple A-
rating), despite the relatively weak nature of the eurozone countries’ guarantees.
Each eurozone country only guarantees a portion of EFSF’s capital, so-called
pro-rate guarantees. In contrast, the EFSM and other EU lending instruments
are based on joint liability. The latter implies that all participating countries
guarantee the reimbursement of loans to creditors59.
Because of its weak guarantees, it is believed that the EFSF can only maintain
the best credit rating if it does not lend out more than the sum of guarantees
provided by the six eurozone countries holding a triple A-rating. This represents
EUR 255 billion60. Eurozone countries have committed to increase the EFSF’s
guarantees to EUR 780 billion, which increases the triple-A countries’ share of
guarantees to more than EUR 440 billion. This should ensure an effective lend-
ing capacity of EUR 440 billion, while at the same time maintaining the EFSF’s
triple A-rating61.
58. In 2009, eurozone GDP was EUR 9 194 billion, see: ECB, Monthly Bulletin, April 2011, http://
www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mobu/mb201104en.pdf
59. A holder of an EFSM debt obligation can require full compensation from any Member State in case a
country would be unable to reimburse its loans to the EFSM. Whereas for the EFSF, a eurozone country is
only obliged to provide the amount of its specific guarantee.
60. See: WATTRET, K., EFSF: Q&A Update, pp. 14-18 In: BNP PARISBAS, Market Mover, 87 p., 9
December 2010, http://bnpparibasinvestindia.com/files/1209_MM.pdf
61. Conclusions of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area, 11 March 2011, p. 3.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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b. Financial Assistance by the Facility
The financial assistance facility can provide financial assistance in two ways: by
providing loans and by the direct purchasing of government debt from Member
States that requested European assistance. The latter was not part of the initial
instruments of the assistance facility. It was only in March 2011 that the Heads
of State or Government allowed the EFSF to carry out such operations. Up until
June 2011, the instrument has not been used.
Financial assistance in the forms of loans has, on the on the other hand, been
provided on several occasions. By the first half of 2011, two eurozone countries
had requested assistance from this rescue package: Ireland and Portugal. In
response to the Irish request for financial assistance, a financial assistance pack-
age worth EUR 85 billion was provided in December 201062. The international
part of the financial assistance package represents EUR 67.5 billion63. In April
2011, Portugal also requested financial assistance. It received an international
financial assistance package of EUR 78 billion64.
As mentioned above, Greece is to receive a new financial assistance package,
financed by the temporary assistance facility and it is not impossible that Ireland
or Portugal request more financial assistance. Other countries, such as Spain,
might require financial assistance as well. The continuing need for financial
assistance and the extension of existing programmes raises serious question with
regard to the sufficiency and the sense of the financial assistance facility.
4.2.3. European Central Bank Assistance
The aforementioned initiatives were not the only actions undertaken at the
European level. The ECB also changed its policies in light of the sovereign debt
crisis. First, it has continued to accept Greek government bonds as collateral,
despite the fact that its rating has been downgraded below the previously set
minimum65.
62. Of this sum, EUR 17.5 billion originates from Irish Treasury cash reserves and contributions from the
Irish National Pensions Reserve Fund.
63. Contributions come from bilateral loans by Denmark, the UK and Sweden (EUR 4.8 billion in total),
the eurozone’s EFSF (EUR 17.7 billion), the Commission’s EFSM (EUR 22.5 billion) and the IMF (EUR
22.5 billion). See: Recital 6 of Council of the European Union, Council implementing Decision on grant-
ing Union financial assistance to Ireland, 7 December 2010, 17211/1/10 REV 1.
64. The EFSF, the EFSM and the IMF are each to contribute EUR 26 billion. See: Statement by the Euro-
group and ECOFIN Ministers, 16 May 2011.
65. European Central Bank, ECB announces change in eligibility of debt instruments issued or guaranteed
by the Greek government, Press Release, 3 May 2010, http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2010/html/
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Afterwards, the ECB started to buy government bonds in secondary markets,
where investors sell bonds to other investors. These actions are referred to as the
ECB’s Securities Markets Programme66. As of May 2011, the ECB owned EUR
75 billion worth of government bonds67, which is – by way of comparison –
more than Portugal’s financing needs for the period 2011-201368. Buying bonds
in secondary market provides only indirect aid to the troubled countries. This in
contrast to the EFSF’s competence to buy government bonds directly from euro-
zone countries. The combination of both instruments, the EFSF’s direct purchas-
ing of bonds and the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme, stretches the Treaty
to its limits69.
Both the temporary lending facility and the ECB operations lead to extra liquid-
ity in the financial system70. This can create additional inflation, which runs
completely against the ECB’s core objective: price stability71. The ECB would
also be hit hard by a debt restructuring, making it a biased party. Some state that
the ECB risks losing its independence and credibility as a consequence of its
unconventional actions72.
4.3. Working on a Long Term Response: Reforming 
European Economic Governance
Most of the EU’s response to the sovereign debt crisis tackles short term liquidity
problems. Neither the ECB’s policy changes nor the rescue mechanism, however,
are capable of resolving the high and ever-increasing public debt across the euro-
zone, nor did they deal with issues of competitiveness. Financial assistance, then,
cannot be a long term solution.
66. European Central Bank, ECB decides on measures to address severe tensions in financial markets,
Press Release, 10 May 2010, http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100510.en.html
67. See: ECB, Open Market Operations. Summary of ad hoc communication, 23 May 2011, retrievable
on: http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/omo/html/communication.en.html
68. Portugal’s financing need for the period 2011-2013 is EUR 72 billion, see: BUITER, W., GIANI, G., et
al., The Debt of Nations, Global Economics View, Citi, 7 January 2011, p. 37.
69. As was mentioned above, the Treaty provides that the ECB cannot buy government debt directly from
the Member States. As part of its crisis response, the EU has circumvented this restriction to its limits. The
ECB can buy public debt, but only on the secondary market, while another body (the EFSF) does so on
the primary market.
70. In principle, the ECB Securities Market Programme is to reabsorb an equivalent of the public debt it
buys from financial markets. However, it has not always been able to do so, which creates small addi-
tional liquidity in the financial system.
71. Article 127(1) TFEU.
72. See for example: ANNUNZIATA, M., The ECB’s Independence Is in Jeopardy, Opinion Europe, Wall
Street Journal, 6 May 2010; WYPLOSZ, C., European Stabilisation Mechanism: Promises, realities and
principles, 12 May 2010, voxEU, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5031 and BOSKIN, M., Time
to Constrain Government, 25 May 2010, Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commen-
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Faced with the failure of economic governance, policy-makers had, in a nutshell,
three long term reform options. The first option was to end the monetary union
and thus to break up the eurozone. This would result in the re-introduction of
national currencies or in various monetary unions across the EU. A second
option was to create a full-fledged economic and political union, which implies
a major shift in decision-making from the national to the European level. The
final option consisted of simply revising the current framework.
The first two options hardly seemed feasible, as there was no consensus on their
benefits, nor any major political support73. Therefore, the course of action cho-
sen by policy-makers consisted of revising the European economic governance
provisions. While this response is, politically speaking, the most feasible, it is all
but certain whether it will be successful. In order to have a better view of what
the reforms should aim to achieve, it is therefore necessary to first discuss earlier
shortcomings in economic governance.
73. A full-fledged political union is mainly contested from a perspective of subsidiarity, while a break-up
of the eurozone risks leading to economic distress which deters policy-makers from considering the
option, see: CLIFFE, M., et al., EMU Break-up. Quantifying the Unthinkable, Financial Markets
Research, ING, 7 July 2010.29
5. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE
Doubts on the viability of the Economic and Monetary Union are not new. Ever
since the EMU was created there has been debate on this subject74. The 2010
sovereign debt crisis did, however, abruptly change the nature of the debate.
The sovereign debt crisis has made it clear that European economic governance
did not offer enough leverage to deal with the increased interdependence caused
by the monetary union75. Either rules failed to meet their objectives (see fiscal
sustainability), or they were inadequate (see macro-economic convergence) or
they were simply missing (see crisis governance). Besides failed rules, a major
overarching problem was the Member States’ general disregard for European
economic governance provisions.
5.1. Inability to Impose Fiscal Sustainability
The most obvious shortcomings of economic governance lie in its fiscal rules.
Rules meant to discipline Member States were simply not abided by, notwith-
standing the sensed need for robust fiscal positions, and the envisaged sanctions.
5.1.1. Unsound Fiscal Evolutions
Even before the financial crisis (so before 2008), the EU rules had not been able
to prevent unsound fiscal evolutions. The failure of the EU to impose its rules is
evident when looking at Member States’ budgets since the single currency was
introduced. Each Member State was to keep its public deficit within the 3% of
GDP limit76. Nonetheless, numerous countries have had deficits exceeding this
threshold. Between 1999 and 2007, seven out of the twelve initial eurozone
countries77 had a deficit exceeding 3% of GDP at least once78. Several countries
even had multiple budgets exceeding the 3% deficit limit. In France, one out of
three annual budgets exceeded the limit, while for Germany, Italy and Portugal
74. See for example: BORDO, M., JONUNG, L., The Future Of EMU: What Does The History Of Mon-
etary Unions Tell Us?, National Bureau Of Economic Research, Working Paper 7365, 1999 and CON-
NOLLY, B., WHITTAKER, J., What Will Happen to the Euro?, Economic Affairs, Volume 23, Issue 1,
2003, pp. 49-54.
75. See to this extent: IOANNOU, D., STRACCA, L., Have euro area and EU economic governance
worked? Just the facts, ECB Working Paper Series, NO 1344, May 2011.
76. See Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, TFEU.
77. I.e. the twelve countries that were member of the eurozone in 2001.
78. These countries are Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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this was the case for about half of their annual budgets79. More stunningly,
Greece has never had a deficit of less than 3% of GDP since it joined the EU80.
The goal of the EU’s deficit rules, however, is not just to have deficits of less than
3%, but also to achieve medium term budgets close to balance or in surplus. In
this respect as well, EU fiscal rules failed. In the period 1999-2007, the average
budget deficit of the initial twelve eurozone countries was 1.8% of GDP. This is
far from being close to balance, let alone surplus.
These assessments are based on ex-post figures, which sometimes differ consid-
erably from the initial figures. This is especially the case for Greece. Its deficit
figures have almost continuously been revised upwards. Due to this misrepre-
sentation by Greece, the size of deficits was often not discovered until after-
wards, when procedures had already finished81. To a lesser extent, these prob-
lems also occurred in other eurozone countries82.
Deficit evolutions since the financial crisis highlight other shortcomings in the
fiscal rules of the Union. Some eurozone countries have seen their deficits
increase at an alarming speed. In 2009, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain had
deficits of more than 10% of GDP83. EU rules were not able to prevent the sharp
deterioration of public finances.
Several reasons can explain the abnormally large budget deficits that followed
the economic and financial crisis. A first, obvious reason is the dire straits budg-
ets were in prior to the crisis. This was notably the case in Greece and Portugal,
which had 2007 deficits of respectively 6.4% and 2.8% of GDP. Secondly, in
some countries both public revenue and expenditure were tremendously
affected by the crisis. Due to their weakened competitiveness and large current
account deficits (see infra), these countries’ entire economies suffered more than
average from the crisis. Furthermore, some countries’ public revenues heavily
depended on a few sectors – such as the tourism, real estate and financial sectors
– that suffered significantly from the crisis. On the expenditure side, the bailout
of the financial sector in Ireland was worth 20% of GDP, vastly pushing up its
budget deficit.
79. Source: European Commission, General Government data. General Government Revenue, Expendi-
ture, Balances and Gross Debt, Part II: Tables by Series, Table 53B, p.154, autumn 2010 and own calcula-
tions.
80. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database April 2011.
81. European Commission, Report on Greek Government Deficit and Debt Statistics, 8 January 2010,
COM(2010) 1 final.
82. See: GORDO MORA, L, NOGUEIRA MARTINS, J., How reliable are the statistics for the Stability
and Growth Pact?, European Economy Economic Papers, no 273, February 2007.
83. Source: Eurostat database.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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In contrast to the budget deficits, overall debt evolution was not particularly
discouraging prior to the crisis. In the period 1999-2007, average debt-to-GDP
in the twelve initial eurozone countries decreased by more than 5 percentage
points (from 71.9% to 66.6% of GDP). However, some countries evolved
against this trend, including countries with high debt levels (Greece; +11 per-
centage points) or low growth (Portugal; +13 percentage points). The perform-
ance of a country like Italy also appears inadequate: although Italy reduced its
debt level by 10 percentage points during this period, it was not able to bring its
debt level below 100% of GDP.
5.1.2. The Shortcomings of Fiscal Rules
In discussing the effects of EU fiscal rules, four major shortcomings can be iden-
tified. In the first place, the surveillance was based on too few and too rigid
parameters. In evaluating fiscal positions, the focus was predominantly on the
3% deficit to GDP rule. Other considerations, notably the level of debt and the
medium-term budget balance seem to have been largely overlooked by policy-
makers. The heavy dependence on certain sources of revenues was also taken
into account insufficiently. Fiscal surveillance missed a long term approach.
A second shortcoming lies in the occasional lack of quality of the data provided
to the EU. The Commission’s statistical office Eurostat had to rely on data pro-
vided by the Member States and could do little to verify this data84. The result
was an assessment based on incorrect figures.
Thirdly, the Excessive Deficit Procedure proved ineffective. It is a lengthy proc-
ess, as several steps have to be taken before a warning can be issued. It takes
even longer before recommendations or sanctions could be applied. The
required cooperation between the Commission and the Council made the Pro-
cedure even more cumbersome. The Commission was in a weak position as its
reports, opinions and recommendations were all non-binding. Political bargain-
ing in the Council made it difficult to advance the Excessive Deficit Procedure85.
Finally, the fiscal rules missed a functioning stick-and-carrot approach. The
rules had no carrot, as no rewards for prudent fiscal policy were foreseen. The
stick was there, but proved impracticable. In fact, the envisaged sanctions were
never applied. Sanctions were not gradual enough and they could only be
84. A 2005 revision of Eurostat’s powers has not proven sufficient to ensure trustworthy statistics, see:
Council Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005 of 12 December 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 as
regards the quality of statistical data in the context of the excessive deficit procedure.
85. For more detail, see: ZGAJEWSKI, T., HAJJAR, K., The stability and growth Pact has it a future?,
Studia Diplomatica, Vol. LVII, n° 6, 2004 (published in Nov. 2005).THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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administered at the very end of the lengthy Excessive Deficit Procedure. The
scope of sanctions was furthermore limited to those of a financial nature. This
seems inappropriate, since – given the lengthy procedure – a country would
already be facing financial difficulties when it was penalised. Politically speak-
ing, sanctions have never been called upon since this would have required
finance ministers to apply sanctions to their peers. They have been most reluc-
tant to take such steps86.
5.2. Insufficient Macro-economic Convergence
While the ineffectiveness of fiscal rules can be easily identified as a major cause
of the sovereign debt crisis, fiscal discipline alone would most likely not have
been able to prevent a eurozone crisis. Ireland and Spain, for instance, adhered
to the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Nevertheless, both had to adopt
harsh austerity measures and Ireland even had to request European financial
assistance. An important part of their problems results from the unsound
macro-economic evolutions they experienced since the start of the eurozone.
5.2.1. Unsound Macro-economic Evolutions
On the surface, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain seemed to perform rather
well, ever since joining the eurozone. In terms of economic growth, Greece, Ire-
land and Spain performed significantly better than the average eurozone coun-
try. This is in contrast to Germany, which experienced small economic growth.
However, growth in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain was largely driven by
internal demand and the construction sector. Their export growths were below
the eurozone average87. In contrast, Germany’s exports grew significantly faster
than the eurozone average, while its internal demand was relatively weak. The
contrast in GDP and consumption growth versus exports figures resulted in
increased macro-economic divergences, which is reflected in the evolution of
competitiveness (see Table 1).
86. A parallel can be drawn with Article 259 TFEU, which allows a Member State to pursue legal actions
against other Member States if it is of the opinion that they fail to fulfill an obligation under the Treaties.
These provisions have hardly been used. Instead, the Commission brings such cases before the European
Court of Justice.
87. With exception of Ireland, where export growth did not begin to deteriorate until 2005.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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Table 1: Average annual change of key economic indicators in the period 1999-200788
The increasing macro-economic divergences led to large current account imbal-
ances. A prime way of financing the economic growth in countries with large
current account deficits was by taking on more private and/or public debt. The
resulting high debt levels rendered them more vulnerable to an economic down-
turn. Germany on the other hand, developed a considerable current account
surplus (see Table 2).
Table 2: Current Accounts and Debt (in percentage of GDP)
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b. Average annual change in the harmonised competitiveness index based on GDP deflators (1999 =100)
Germany 1.6% 0.9% -1.5% 7.9% 1.8% 1.2
Greece 4.1% 3.9% 3.8% 5.2% 3.3% -0.8
Ireland 6.5% 6% 7.6% 8.4% 3.4% -2.1
Spain 3.7% 4.2% 5.5% 5.3% 3.3% -2
Portugal 1.8% 2.2% 1% 5.5% 2.9% -0.7
Eurozone 2.2% 2% 2.1% 5.9% 2.3% -0.1
88. Sources: GDP and Total Consumption: AMECO Database; Investment in Construction: European
Economic Forecast – autumn 2010; Exports and Inflation: IMF World Economic Outlook Database April
2011; Competitiveness: ECB.
Current Account 
Balancea
a. Figures are for 2007. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database April 2011.
Debtb
b. Figures are for 2009.
Privatec
c. Financial debt is calculated as the sum of loans and securities other than shares using consolidated
amounts except for Ireland. Source: OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2010, p.30
Publicd
d. Source: Ameco database.
Total
Germany 7.6% 129.1% 73.4% 202.5%
Greece -14.4% 121.4% 126.8% 248.2%
Ireland -5.3% 325% 65.5% 390.5%
Spain -10% 206.4% 53.2% 259.6%
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While weakened competitiveness and current account deficits seem more detri-
mental than increases thereof, in a monetary union both matter. The lack of
convergence between Member States’ economies makes the single monetary pol-
icy less appropriate, both for the stronger and the weaker economies. In relation
to their economic performances, Ireland and Spain were faced with an overly
loose monetary policy, which led to higher inflation and is likely to have stimu-
lated their housing bubbles89.
5.2.2. The Shortcomings of Macro-economic Convergence 
Instruments
The aforementioned evolutions took place despite the macro-economic surveil-
lance and coordination mechanisms in place. The EU proved unable to detect or
correct macro-economic divergences. Three main reasons can be given for the
ineffectiveness of EU macro-economic convergence instruments.
A first reason is the shortfall of EU rules. EU macro-economic surveillance and
coordination were focused on stimulating good policy practices and structural
reforms. Such a focus led to reduced attention to unsound macro-economic evo-
lutions and divergences. There was no formal EU supervision mechanism to
monitor potentially unsound economic evolutions. Even when the EU would
detect an imbalance, it lacked competences to require policy changes. EU macro-
economic policy surveillance and coordination instruments were all non-bind-
ing. In essence, policy changes remain subject to the willingness of Member
States.
The non-binding nature of EU macro-economic policy coordination is partly
due to the uncertainty about what are considered correct macro-economic evo-
lutions. This is a second reason why economic convergence instruments
remained unused90. Evaluating macro-economic evolutions is more difficult
than evaluating fiscal evolutions. While there is a large consensus on the need
for fiscal sustainability, such a consensus is absent when it comes to the level of
current account balances and other macro-economic variables.
Indeed, current account and competitiveness evolutions can be caused by benign
and/or temporary evolutions, such as demographic evolutions or the catching
up of lower-income countries. Distinguishing between benign and harmful evo-
89. SEYFRIED, W., Monetary policy and housing bubbles: a multinational perspective, Research in Busi-
ness and Economics Journal, vol. 2, 2010.
90. MARZINOTTO, B., PISANI-FERRY, J., SAPIR, A., Two Crises, Two Responses, Bruegel Policy Brief,
Issue 2010/01, March 2010.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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lutions proves difficult and far from infallible. While in retrospect certain evo-
lutions can be identified as harmful, it is hard to make such judgments on the
basis of live data.91. In addition, while the concept of competitiveness is used
very often, it remains rather vague and has been highly criticized. Competitive-
ness is a zero-sum variable, where one party’s gains imply another party’s losses.
In this sense, it tends to overlook the overall beneficial effects of trade92.
Finally, even if macro-economic imbalances are detected and there is a willing-
ness to address them, it remains challenging to do so. The nature of macro-
economic evolutions is such that Member States do not always have full control
over them. Member States can only indirectly influence key macro-economic
variables, such as private wage evolutions, asset prices and current accounts93.
The limited role of governments in macro-economic evolutions should be under-
scored and could be important in further discussions on macro-economic coor-
dination. However, it should not lead to neglecting the other reasons for failed
macro-economic convergence.
5.3. Absence of Crisis Governance Provisions
In line with the no bailout clause and the avoidance of moral hazard (see 2.1.2),
there were no crisis governance provisions with regard to eurozone countries.
This is in contrast to provisions for non-eurozone countries, for which financial
assistance in the case of balance of payment problems had been foreseen94. Such
problems notably include difficulties to meet future international payment obli-
gations, which was a major reason for aid to Greece95.
In light of the sovereign debt crisis, the strategy not to foresee the possibility of
financial assistance to eurozone countries proved erroneous. The strategy did
not achieve its goals, as it has proven unable to prevent the eurozone sovereign
debt crisis. Furthermore, the strategy’s impact on fiscal prudency can be ques-
91. For instance, according to the competitiveness index used before, Luxemburg and Slovakia’s competi-
tiveness decreased much sharper than the competitiveness of Greece, Ireland, Portugal or Spain. Yet, as of
mid 2011, these countries do not face sovereign debt issues.
92. KRUGMAN, P., Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, nr. 2, 1994.
93. GROS, D., Europe’s Competitiveness Obsession, CEPS Commentaries, 5 June 2010.
94. Article 108 of the Treaty of Rome. Currently, Article 143 TFEU. This Article has been detailed in
Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 of 18 February 2002 establishing a facility providing medium-
term financial assistance for Member States’ balances of payments, OJ L 53, 23.2.2002, pp. 1-3.
95. The system of balance of payments assistance for non-eurozone countries has been used during the
economic and financial crisis. Three non-eurozone countries have been provided with balance of pay-
ments assistance in the form of EU credit: Hungary, Latvia and Romania. The total amount of such aid
amounts to EUR 14.6 billion. See the Memoranda of Understanding between the European Community
and the Republic of Hungary (17 and 19 November 2008), the Republic of Latvia (26 and 28 January
2009) and the Republic of Romania (23 June 2009) respectively.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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tioned. It was not able to stimulate pressure by the financial markets, as inves-
tors did not sufficiently discriminate between prudent and imprudent eurozone
countries96.
Besides the failure to induce fiscal prudence, the strategy has proven costly
because of its lack of endgame provisions. This postponed the EU’s response to
the crisis, which aggravated problems in Greece and contributed to the spread-
ing of the crisis to other eurozone countries. As problems aggravated to a point
where intervention was necessary, EU leaders had to provide a eurozone answer
to the crisis in the end. This ad-hoc crisis response had to be developed under
considerable time constraints and increasing market pressure. The EU’s response
proved to contain some loose ends that resulted in more uncertainty, which
undermined its effectiveness97. It also increased the EU’s perceived indecisive-
ness, which worsened the crisis.
5.4. A Neglect of European Economic Governance by 
Member States
Regulatory shortcomings alone do not explain the failure of European economic
governance. Member States’ commitment to ensure a viable monetary union
was clearly lacking as well. Too often, it was believed that the success of the
single currency was the responsibility of the ECB alone98.
The complexity of economic governance framework contributed to and rein-
forced this lack of ownership. The multitude of procedures and their varying
degrees of alignment made it difficult for policy-makers (let alone the general
public) to understand the functioning of economic governance. Furthermore,
the complexity of governance instruments seems to have obscured the core pur-
pose of economic governance, i.e. dealing with the ever-growing mutual inter-
dependence.
Due to both general neglect and complexity, Member States failed to see the
need for European economic governance. This lack of ownership ran through
96. European legislation even encourages equal treatment of prudent and imprudent eurozone countries,
as the Capital Requirements Directive does not require any risk weighing for eurozone debt. This implies
that financial institutions do not have to hold any additional capital to take into account risk associated
with eurozone sovereign debt. See: Capital Requirement Directive 2006/48/EC and BISHOP, G., Market
Discipline on Eurozone Public Debt, 26 April 2010, 7 p., retrievable on: http://www.grahambishop.com/
DocumentStore/7c993f66-1a04-4625-b93c-802bb244dcba.pdf
97. An example is the EFSF’s theoretic versus real lending capacities (see supra).
98. VAN DEN NOORD, P., et al., The Evolution of Economic Governance in EMU, European Commis-
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all parts of European economic governance. While there often were surveillance
instruments and binding sanctions, they were left unused. Member States did
not want to interfere with each other’s policies, let alone punish each other. Yet,
a single currency requires more coordination among its members, including con-
trol of each other’s economic policies.
Achieving a shift in the mindset of Member States might prove to be more diffi-
cult than achieving regulatory reform. Stricter and better rules are one way to
deal with a lack of ownership. In view of the European construction, ownership
by Member States of European economic governance appears at least as crucial.
Renewed neglect by the Member States of the European dimension of their pol-
icies is not an eminent threat, as the recent crisis experiences will surely have an
impact on their behaviour. However, as time goes by and new political leaders
emerge this effect is likely to fade away. Therefore, the reform of the economic
governance framework should result in a clearer and more robust system, so as
to ensure the monetary union’s long term sustainability.39
6. REFORMING ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
The sovereign debt crisis and the shortcomings of economic governance that it
revealed called for changes to the governance framework. These reforms were
much needed, but will not solve the debt crisis in Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
Its purpose is rather to prevent and mitigate future crises.
The reforms fall into two types. On the one hand, the EU is to reform existing
economic governance. This governance concerns situations in which eurozone
countries do not require external financial assistance, i.e. in the absence of acute
stress. On the other hand, European “crisis governance” is being introduced. In
future, crisis governance needs to do deal with situations in which eurozone
countries are not able to finance themselves at affordable interest rates. This
latter type of governance is discussed in the next chapter. Here, the focus is on
the reform of existing economic governance.
In September 2010, The Commission proposed six legislative acts to reform
existing economic governance. The European Council called for an agreement to
be reached in June 201199. Intense negotiations took place between the Parlia-
ment and the Council. These negotiations did, however, not result in a finalised
agreement by the end of June 2011. The remaining bone of contention was the
role of the Commission in advancing the fiscal surveillance procedure, a note-
worthy element of the reform. Nonetheless, the lack of agreement on the matter
does not prevent a general assessment of the economic governance reforms.
This chapter discusses the most significant reforms. These reforms aim to
strengthen fiscal sustainability rules (6.1) and will put in place a procedure to
avoid macro-economic divergences (6.2). In order to make economic govern-
ance less open-ended for eurozone countries, some measures have been taken
with a focus on the eurozone. These notably concern strengthened sanctions, as
well as the Euro Plus Pact (6.3).
The reforms add several new procedures to the economic governance frame-
work. This risks making economic governance even more complex and could
therefore undermine the general public and national administrations’ under-
standing even further. The European Semester is a partial answer to this prob-
lem, as it reinforces dialogue between the EU and the Member States and aims
to better align fiscal and macro-economic surveillance instruments (6.4). How-
ever, economic governance will remain a complex matter.
99. Conclusions of the European Council of 16-17 December 2010, EUCO 30/1/10/
REV 1, 25 January 2011, p. 5.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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6.1. Fiscal Sustainability
Up to the sovereign debt crisis, European fiscal surveillance concentrated almost
exclusively on the current budget deficit. In reforming the fiscal rules, policy-
makers seek to focus more on the longer term. Furthermore, the reforms aim to
improve the quality of national fiscal planning.
6.1.1. Working Towards Long Term Fiscal Soundness
The EU Institutions seek to take more variables than the fiscal deficit into
account when evaluating a Member States’ budget. This should result in less
short-termism. However, the problem before was not so much that the EU rules
did not allow for other variables – such as the level of debt and pension costs –
to be taken into account. Variables other than budget deficits missed concrete
targets, which resulted in neglect of these variables. Therefore, the reforms aim
to take more variables better into account, especially public expenditure
increases and tax cuts, as well as public debt evolutions.
a. Taking Public Debt into Account
The Treaty already states that public debt should not exceed 60% of GDP,
unless the debt ratio is “sufficiently diminishing100”. This concept had been left
undefined. In reforming economic governance, the concept is to be made oper-
ational.
A numerical rule that determines the required pace of debt reduction for coun-
tries whose debt exceeds 60% of GDP will be put in place101. The rule implies
that each country will have to reduce the difference between its debt level and
the 60% debt target by 1/20th per year on average. To take into account yearly
fluctuations, debt reduction will be measured on a three-year basis102.
Therefore, a country with a debt-to-GDP level of 70% would have to cut its debt
(on average) by 0.5 percentage points by the next year. A country with a deficit
of 100% of GDP would have to cut its debt by 2 percentage points. A debt-to-
100. Article 126(2)b TFEU.
101. See: Article 1(2)b of European Commission, Proposal for Proposal for a Council Regulation amend-
ing Regulation No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the exces-
sive deficit procedure, COM(2010) 526, 29 September 2010.
102. The three-year average rule implies that a countries’ debt-to-GDP that exceeds the 60% threshold
needs to diminish by 14.26% (or 1- 19/20³) in three years’ time. For the examples in Table 3, this implies
that debt-to-GDP in year n+3 should be respectively 68.6%, 94.3%, 120%, and 145.7%. For the sake of
clarity, this three-year average rule has not been included in the Table.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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GDP level of a 160% of GDP would imply cutting debt by 5 percentage points
(see Table 3). The latter is not a fictional example, as Greece’s debt is set to reach
such a level in 2012.
Table 3: Debt reduction rule
A breach of the numerical debt rule would, however, not automatically lead to
an Excessive Deficit Procedure. Other economic variables, such as pension
reforms and private debt are also to be taken into account.
The numerical debt rule will require an enormous and sustained effort from
Member States with high public debt levels, notably Greece. Furthermore, the
rule is rather complicated. For these reasons, some had pleaded for simpler
rules. For example, an average yearly debt reduction of 0.5 percentage points
per 10 percentage points of debt-to-GDP exceeding 60%, with a maximum
required effort of 2 percentage points103. This could have resulted in more real-
istic efforts from highly indebted countries104.
b. A Cap on Public Expenditure Increases and Tax Cuts
Some Member States with previously sound budgets proved to be hard hit by
the financial and economic crisis. Their budgets deteriorated massively, as they
were often dependent on the growth of a few sectors. In an attempt to render
Member States’ budget better prepared for such sudden shocks, a prudent fiscal
policy-making rule was added to the Stability and Growth Pact105.
Debt-to-GDP 
level in year n
Difference with the 
60% benchmark
Required annual debt 
reduction
Required debt
level in year n+1
70% 10 p.p. 0.5 p.p. 69.5%
100% 40 p.p. 2 p.p. 98%
130% 70 p.p. 3.5 p.p. 126.5%
160% 100 p.p. 5 p.p. 155%
103. This implies the following debt-to-GDP percentage points reduction targets: ]60%-70%]: 0.5p.p.;
]70%-80%]: 1p.p.; ]80%-90%]: 1.5p.p.; ]90%: 2p.p.
104. MAYSTADT, P., keynote speech at EGMONT-CCECRB expert seminar “The Financial and Eco-
nomic Crisis: Overcoming the Shortcomings of the European Framework”, 6 December 2010.
105. European Commission, Proposal for amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of
the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies,
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The rule implies that a Member State’s public expenditure increases and tax cuts
cannot surpass the expected medium-term GDP growth rate. However, there are
three exceptions to this rule. Firstly, when the expenditure increase or tax cut is
counterbalanced by other fiscal changes (respectively a tax increase or expendi-
ture decrease). Secondly, when the Member State’s previously established budg-
etary trajectory (the medium-term budgetary objective) is met or overachieved.
Finally, certain types of expenditure, such as automatic stabilisers (for example
unemployment benefits), certain types of investment and interest expenditures
can be excluded.
At any rate, in practice, the prudent fiscal policy-making rule is not so different
from the existing budgetary objectives. If a country’s expenditure grows out of
line with its revenue, this evidently has a budgetary impact. Only when current
GDP growth and expected future GDP growth differ, would the rule be relevant.
Yet, a substantial problem in applying this rule is that it is difficult to determine
a country’s expected GDP growth. This uncertainty is likely to undermine the
rule’s relevance. Nonetheless, it does put a greater focus on expenditure. The
rule can counteract, to a certain extent, the effects of one-off budgetary meas-
ures and unexpected revenue increases. However, it is doubtful that the principle
would have prevented the problems in Ireland and Spain.
6.1.2. Improving National Fiscal Planning
As was mentioned earlier, there was a neglect of fiscal rules among Member
States. The lack of ownership sometimes resulted in weak procedures, unreliable
statistics and deficient fiscal planning in the Member States. To deal with these
issues, Member States will have to adopt national budgetary rules that meet
certain minimum requirements. The EU is aware that such rules are not fool-
proof. Therefore, it has also been made easier for the Commission to carry out
inspections missions to verify national statistics.
a. National Budgetary Rules
A set of minimum requirements for Member States’ budgetary frameworks are
to increase both the attention to fiscal planning, as well as its quality106. They
will concern, inter alia, minimum rules on accounting, reporting, statistics and
numerical targets.
106. Council of the European Union, Draft Council Directive on requirements for budgetary frameworks
of the Member States, 2010/0277 (NLE), 17 March 2011.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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Member States would have to establish multi-annual budgetary frameworks.
The figures on which Member States base their planning will need to meet cer-
tain requirements. Particularly, they will have to include negative scenarios, and
their figures should be in line with the Commission’s forecasts. Member States
will have to point out any differences between their forecasts and those of the
Commission.
Also, national numerical rules on debt and deficits will have to be adopted.
However, sanctions for breaching these rules are not required. National numer-
ical rules can undoubtedly be useful, but the benefit of just copying EU rules
seems negligible, as these are already directly applicable in the Member States.
It could furthermore be seen as undermining the legal principles of precedence
and direct effect.
Each Member State will be required to have a functional autonomous body that
monitors Member States’ fiscal policies. Although this is an improvement, it
stops short of requiring independent national fiscal councils, which are entities
staffed by non-elected professionals that provide impartial oversight of fiscal
performance. This is despite research showing the beneficial effects of such
councils107.
Finally, the Directive will have important consequences for the regional and
local governments. They, too, will be subject to certain budgetary rules and
reporting requirements. Any local government would have to be able to provide
fiscal data at least on a three-monthly basis.
b. Increased European Surveillance of National Budgets
As national rules are no guarantees for success, the EU has endowed the Com-
mission’s statistical office Eurostat with surveillance powers to verify the quality
of national statistics. In 2010, Eurostat’s powers were expanded108. The new
rules make it easier for Eurostat to conduct comprehensive visits109 to Member
States in order to verify their statistical data. Even with these new rules, compre-
hensive visits can only be conducted in exceptional cases, when specific problems
107. See for example: HAGEMANN, R., Improving Fiscal Performance Through Fiscal Councils, OECD
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 829, 2010 and BOGAERT, H. et al., Fiscal councils, inde-
pendent forecasts and the budgetary process: lessons from the Belgian case, Working Paper4-06, Belgian
Federal Planning Bureau, 2006.
108. Council Regulation (EU) No 679/2010 of 26 July 2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 as
regards the quality of statistical data in the context of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ L 198, 30 July
2010, p. 1-4.
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have been identified. Eurostat’s auditing powers therefore remain limited110.
The revision of fiscal surveillance procedures explicitly foresees the possibility
for Eurostat to conduct surveillance missions in case specific goals in the fiscal
surveillance procedure are not met. In some specific cases, the same goes for
macro-economic surveillance (see infra). However, it is rather inconsistent that
Eurostat’s powers differ according to whether the statistical problems concern
fiscal or macro-economic surveillance.
6.2. Macro-economic Convergence
Macro-economic evolutions were already monitored in the past, notably by
means of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. Yet, the focus was predomi-
nantly on positive targets, rather than surveillance of negative evolutions. In
addition, the monitoring did not enjoy much visibility or attention outside of the
finance ministers’ Council meetings. The EU hopes to overcome this problem by
putting in place a more visible and effective macro-economic surveillance pro-
cedure.
6.2.1. Surveillance of Macro-economic Imbalances
The legislative package introduces a new macro-economic surveillance instru-
ment111. This surveillance will be carried out on the basis of a scoreboard, which
will contain a limited number of indicators that are to monitor macro-economic
evolutions. Pre-determined thresholds need to signal macro-economic imbal-
ance and could result in further actions.
While the scoreboard is at the centre of the new surveillance instrument, its
content will be decided upon at a later stage. The Commission, in cooperation
with the Council and the Parliament, will draw up the scoreboard. It goes with-
out saying, though, that defining the exact indicators and their thresholds is of
prime importance and is likely to be a highly contested matter. Although the
content of the scoreboard has not yet been decided upon, its general outline is
already clear. The variables of the scoreboard are to measure three types of
imbalances:
110. The Commission has proposed to change anew the rules with regard to the control of statistics. See:
European Commission, Towards robust quality management for European Statistics, COM(2011) 211
final, 15 April 2011.
111. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on the prevention and correction of macro-
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￿ External imbalances, to be measured by the current account balance and net
foreign asset positions;
￿ Competitiveness imbalances, to be measured by productivity gains, labour
cost and GDP deflators;
￿ Internal imbalances, to be measured by private credit growth, public debt,
added value in the construction sector and the evolution of house prices112.
Surveillance will focus mainly on macro-economic weaknesses, such as current
account deficits and labour cost increases that are not backed by productivity
gains. More controversially, surveillance is also to monitor other types of imbal-
ances, notably current account surpluses.
The Commission will monitor how the Member States perform on the scoreboard
and whether thresholds are surpassed. This analysis is to be supplemented by
additional economic analysis. Surpassing a threshold would therefore not imme-
diately lead to further action. This non-automaticity is due to the controversial
nature of macro-economic surveillance (see 5.2.2). Furthermore, an imbalance
(for example a current account deficit or surplus) can be the consequence of sev-
eral problems. Economic analysis should provide more clarity and potential rem-
edies. The outcome of this scrutiny will remain controversial nonetheless.
6.2.2. Addressing Unsound Macro-economic Evolutions
Means to counteract macro-economic imbalances would differ considerably
between members of the eurozone and other Member States. For both types of
Member States, actions can be taken in a preventive phase and during a subse-
quent Excessive Imbalance Procedure. For eurozone countries, subsequent sanc-
tions are envisaged (see infra).
During the preventive phase, the Commission can warn the Council of imbal-
ances in a Member State. Subsequently, the Council can make recommendations
to the Member State to counteract these imbalances. These recommendations
are to be made public. During the preventive phase, no further follow-up is
provided for.
If the preventive phase proves ineffective, an Excessive Imbalance Procedure can
be initiated. The Council can declare such a Procedure upon recommendation
by the Commission. In that case, the Council shall again make recommenda-
tions to the Member State to counteract the imbalance. The Member State in
112. European Commission, Economic governance: the EU gets tough, European Economy News N° 19,
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question subsequently needs to adopt a corrective action plan based on these
recommendations. The Commission is to monitor the country’s progress, based
on the country’s efforts to implement both the recommendations and the correc-
tive action plan. The Commission shall also draw up progress reports. Both the
corrective action plan and the progress report are to be made public. If needed,
the Commission may conduct surveillance missions.
The enforcement of the Excessive Imbalance Procedure does not stretch beyond
the public nature of a part of the procedure and the possible surveillance mis-
sions. If these instruments fail to lead to the required results, sanctions can only
be applied in the case of eurozone countries (see 6.3.1). For non-eurozone coun-
tries, such enforcement is completely absent. The lack of a sanctioning mecha-
nism for non-eurozone countries risks making the procedure all the more non-
committal for them.
6.3. Measures Specific to the Eurozone
As was mentioned earlier, economic governance was neglected among Member
States as they failed to see its necessity. It was clear that more ownership was
needed. Yet, in several fields a step-up of commitments among all Member
States proved unfeasible. Therefore, farther-reaching governance will be put in
place for those to whom economic governance matters the most: the eurozone
countries. Economic governance in the eurozone is to be made less open-ended
both by lifting commitments and discussions to the level of the European Coun-
cil via the Euro Plus Pact and by reinforcing sanctions.
6.3.1. Strengthened Sanctions
Sanctioning is perceived as the prime way of making governance more impera-
tive. The reform of economic governance will increase the number of sanctions,
as well as their automaticity. As will be discussed below, these changes increase
the potential impact of the sanction toolbox. However, prime weaknesses of
former sanctions have not been undone: political leeway remains and sanctions
are of a pecuniary nature only. Arguably more important, positive incentives –
such as Eurobonds113 – remain absent.
113. Eurobonds are debt instruments that are issued collectively by the eurozone countries, or a different
set of Member States. The Commission has been asked to report on the usefulness of such Eurobonds.
See: DE GRAUWE, P., MOESEN, W., Gains for All: A proposal for a Common Eurobond, CEPS Com-
mentary, 3 April 2009 and DELPLA, J., VON WEIZSÄCKER, J., The Blue Bond Proposal, Bruegel Policy
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a. More Sanctions
As regards the increase of sanctions, a distinction should be made between sanc-
tions that relate to fiscal rules on the one hand and sanctions that relate to
macro-economic surveillance on the other. In both cases, however, the proceeds
of the sanctions will be used to fund the European Stability Mechanism (see 7).
With regard to fiscal rules, the prime goal was to introduce sanctions earlier on
in the surveillance process114. To this extent, an interest-bearing deposit can be
imposed before the Excessive Deficit Procedure is initiated if a eurozone country
fails to meet its budgetary objectives. Once the Excessive Deficit Procedure is
started, sanctions will also be applied sooner. A eurozone country could be
required to make a non-interest bearing deposit from the moment the Council
finds the country to have an excessive deficit115. An actual fine could be admin-
istered if the country fails to act sufficiently on the recommendations of the
Council to reduce its deficit116. The previous last resort sanction117 has equally
been sharpened, as a larger fine can immediately be imposed at the end of the
Excessive Deficit Procedure118.
With regard to macro-economic imbalances, the situation is different. Here,
pecuniary sanctions were non-existent and will now be introduced119. A euro-
zone country can be sanctioned in the case of an Excessive Imbalance Procedure
(see supra) if it fails to adopt an adequate corrective action plan or if insufficient
action is undertaken to meet this plan. In both cases, a fine could be adminis-
tered. As these sanctions only come at the end of the procedure120, macro-eco-
nomic sanctions will be less gradual than fiscal surveillance sanctions.
In addition to the sanctions mentioned above, a fine in case a country deliber-
ately falsifies its statistics is introduced. Taken together, these new sanctioning
possibilities constitute a clear improvement. Yet, they are all of a pecuniary
114. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveil-
lance in the euro area, COM(2010) 524, 29 September 2010.
115. Article 126(6) TFEU.
116. Article 126(8) TFEU.
117. Article 126(11) TFEU.
118. The non-interest-bearing deposit, the interest-bearing deposit and the fine related to Article 126(8)
TFEU would normally all amount to 0.2% of the Member States’ GDP. The amount of the final fine
(Article 126(11) TFEU) is left unchanged and thus ranges between 0.2% and 0.5% of GDP.
119. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on enforcement measures to correct excessive
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, COM(2010) 525, 29 September 2010.
120. An interest-bearing deposit can be imposed if the Member State does not take sufficient action after
corrective recommendations have been made by the Council during the Excessive Imbalance Procedure. A
fine can be administered during the Excessive Imbalance Procedure in case two successive deadlines for
action by the Member State do not result in sufficient action. In both cases, sanctions can only be used in
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nature. Substantial non-pecuniary sanctions did not find enough support and
were thus not included. Notably the suspension of voting rights proved too con-
troversial. Sanctions linked to EU expenditure have not been proposed either,
although such rules could be introduced in the post-2013 EU budget.
b. Semi-automatic Sanctioning
Not only will new sanctions be introduced, sanctions will also become more
automatic. Past experiences have indeed shown that the Council was reluctant
to apply sanctions against peers. Sanctions would, however, not become fully
automatic.
For most sanctions, the so-called reverse voting mechanism will be used121. In
the past, the Council had to decide by qualified majority whether or not to
apply a sanction proposed by the Commission. Under the new voting mecha-
nism, a sanction proposed by the Commission will automatically be adopted,
unless the Council opposes the sanction by a qualified majority within ten days
of the Commission proposal. The tight timeframe and the majority requirement
make it difficult for the Council to block a sanction and empower the Commis-
sion122.
Even under the new voting procedure, effective sanctioning will remain easier
said than done. On the one hand, it is likely that the Commission will be more
careful in proposing sanctions. This could result in fewer proposals for sanc-
tions. On the other hand, political bargaining in the Council is made more dif-
ficult, but remains possible. In sum, reverse voting undoubtedly increases the
likelihood of sanctioning, but it will not be the miracle solution hoped for by
some.
6.3.2. The Euro Plus Pact
At the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2011, a so-called Euro Plus
Pact was agreed upon123. It is a lighter version of a ‘Competitiveness Pact’ that
had earlier been proposed by Germany. The Pact commits all eurozone countries
and a number of other Member States that voluntarily agreed to adhere to the
121. Reverse voting does not apply to the final sanction in the Excessive Deficit Procedure (Article
126(11) TFEU), due to legal constraints.
122. The reverse voting mechanism will also be applied in some other parts of the surveillance proce-
dures, which further empowers the Commission.
123. See: The Euro Plus Pact. Stronger Economic Policy Coordination for Competitiveness and Conver-
gence, Annex I of the Conclusions of the European Council of 24-25 March 2011, EUCO 10/1/11, 20
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Pact (hence the Plus in the Pact’s name)124. While the Euro Plus Pact is focussed
on the eurozone, it is not exclusively a eurozone instrument. Therefore, discus-
sions on the implementation of the Pact will not result in exclusive Euro Group
summits.
The Euro Plus Pact contains a set of goals in four policy areas: competitiveness,
employment, public finances and financial stability125. These goals are far from
new. The Pact proposes several policy actions to achieve the goals, such as
reviewing indexation mechanisms, but Member States remain free to decide on
their own course of action. Very few concrete policy commitments are made by
the participating Member States. Two are worth mentioning. Firstly, the Pact
requires Member States to adopt national legislation that needs to allow for an
orderly resolution of banks. These rules would come in addition to future EU
rules on the matter126. Secondly, the participating countries agree to adopt
national budget rules (see 6.1.2) in a legal vehicle that is of a “sufficiently strong
binding and durable nature127”. With this wording, the Heads of State or Gov-
ernment refer to a legal vehicle that is superior to normal law. It can, however,
be difficult for some Member States to agree on rules in a legal vehicle other than
a normal law, as it typically requires a larger majority.
More important than these few new policy commitments is the fact that discus-
sions on the four aforementioned policy areas will be lifted to the level of the
Heads of State or Government. Every year, Member States are to formulate a
number of commitments to achieve the set goals. The Heads of State or Govern-
ment are to evaluate the ambition of these commitments as well as the actual
results. These high-level evaluations will increase the importance of the discus-
sions. However, no sanctions or incentives are provided for. The result risks
being a talking shop with limited added value.
6.4. The European Semester: An Integrated Procedure?
European economic governance consists of a multitude of mechanisms, to which
the economic governance reform even adds new ones. On the one hand,
EU2020, the BEPGs and the Employment Strategy are to stimulate structural
124. Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania agreed to the Pact. The Czech Republic,
Hungary, Sweden and the United Kingdom do not participate in the Pact.
125. Besides the four policy areas, tax policy coordination is mentioned as a possible future domain of
cooperation. The Pact does not go further than stating that Member States will engage in a dialogue on
the matter.
126. For more information on the Commission’s future Proposal, see: VERHELST, S., Addressing the
financial crisis: the EU’s incomplete regulatory response, Egmont Paper, nr. 39, December 2010.
127. Conclusions of the European Council of 24-25 March 2011, op. cit. footnote 129, p. 19.THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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reforms and economic growth. On the other hand, the Stability and Growth
Pact and the Excessive Deficit and Imbalance Procedures have been put in place
to prevent the derailing of fiscal and macro-economic evolutions. The Euro Plus
Pact is a subsequent addition to these numerous governance mechanisms.
As was mentioned earlier, the complexity of economic governance contributed
to a neglect of its instruments (see 5.4). Furthermore, the national policies and
reform strategies were often elaborated in the Member States, without much
interaction with the EU level. Only their implementation was monitored at the
European level. This ex-post nature of economic governance limited the useful-
ness of the procedures.
The European Semester is an attempt to address these issues128. This Semester
takes place from January to July of each year and its goal is to stimulate the
discussion of Member States’ economic governance programmes. Figure 2 pro-
vides an overview of the European Semester, as conceived by the Commission.
Figure 2: The European Semester of policy coordination129
128. The legal basis of the European Semester is a Code of Conduct endorsed by the Council; see: Specifi-
cations on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and Guidelines on the format and content
of Stability and Convergence Programmes. The Parliament has argued for incorporating the Semester into
the legal provisions on economic governance.
129. Source: European Commission, European Semester of Policy Coordination, retrievable on http://
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The 2011 European Semester was initiated by the Commission’s Annual
Growth Survey130. Although the publication of this document is not required by
the European Semester’s legal provisions, it is likely to kick off future European
Semesters as well131. The input from the Commission and discussions in the
Council are to provide input for the annual European Council spring meeting.
At this meeting, the Heads of State or Government are to identify the general
economic challenges and provide strategic guidance on Member States’ future
fiscal and economic policies. Input from the Parliament was originally not
required, but the economic governance package will endow the Parliament with
a formal role in the entire procedure.
The European Council’s guidance is subsequently to be taken into account by
the Member States in adopting their National Programmes. On the one hand,
these Programmes include the National Reform Programmes, which are
intended to achieve the EU2020 goals and avoid imbalances. On the other hand,
the Stability and Convergence Programmes should achieve the EU’s fiscal goals.
A novelty of the European Semester is that these two Programmes are both to
be adopted in April. The alignment of their timing is meant to ensure more
coherence between the documents.
The National Programmes are subsequently evaluated again at EU level. Like
the ex-ante guidance, the European Council carries out this ex-post evaluation,
based on input by the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. This eval-
uation can lead to a modification of the Member States’ Programmes.
The European Semester has clear advantages. Not only does it allow for better
interaction between the EU and the national level, it can also improve the coor-
dination between the different Council configurations. However, despite the
European Semester, European economic governance will remain a complicated
matter based on several mechanisms. Further streamlining and rationalising the
procedures would be advisable. It is, for example, clear that the growth element
in the Stability and Growth Pact is just window dressing. This is especially true
as another EU instrument, the EU 2020 Strategy is meant to stimulate economic
growth. Such inconsistencies make it all the more difficult for the general public
to grasp economic governance. Yet, in the end, it is the public’s support of Euro-
pean cooperation that will determine the success of the European project and its
common currency.
130. European Commission, Annual Growth Survey: Advancing the EU’s Comprehensive Response to the
Crisis, 12 January 2011, COM(2011) 11 final
131. Legal provisions only require input by the Commission to the European Council meeting of March.53
7. DEVELOPING CRISIS GOVERNANCE
A major conceptual innovation of the economic governance reform is the intro-
duction of eurozone crisis governance. To this purpose, a permanent crisis gov-
ernance framework will be put in place from July 2013 onwards. Such a perma-
nent crisis governance framework alters the conception of the Economic and
Monetary Union. Before the crisis, a crisis governance framework was taboo, as
Member States did not want to commit to any far-reaching solidarity between
them (see 3.1.2). Despite demanding conditions attached to any assistance, the
future assistance framework signals the resolve of the eurozone to aid its weaker
members. The no bailout rhetoric – no assistance to eurozone countries facing
financial difficulties – therefore seems a thing of the past132.
Future crisis governance will consist of two elements. In the first place, condi-
tional financial assistance can be provided when a country faces temporary
problems (7.1). If financial assistance cannot help overcome the crisis, more
drastic crisis governance is to be envisaged. The possibility of debt restructuring
is an important step in this direction (7.2), though it does not solve all remaining
issues.
7.1. Financial assistance
The post-2013 financial assistance will replace the existing temporary assistance
(see 4.2.2), with which it shares many characteristics. Like the existing tempo-
rary mechanism, this permanent assistance framework will provide financial
assistance to Member States in financial difficulties. Due to its permanent
nature, the framework will nonetheless result in some marked changes, notably
a Treaty revision.
7.1.1. The Design of the Financial Assistance Framework
The future financial assistance framework will consist of financing provided by
the IMF and a new, permanent EU body: the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). While the future financial assistance framework is yet to be created, its
general outline has already been agreed upon by the European Council133. The
setting up of the framework could, however, prove a rocky road.
132. The Treaty’s no bailout clause (see 2.1.2) has, however, remained unaltered.
133. See Term Sheet on the ESM, Annex II of the Conclusions of the European Council of 24-25 March
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a. The European Stability Mechanism
The future European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will replace the European arm
of the existing temporary financial assistance facility. The ESM is to have an
effective lending capacity of EUR 500 billion, i.e. the same as the European part
of the temporary lending facility. The ESM’s lending capacity is to be ensured by
a combination of paid-in capital, callable capital and guarantees. These types of
capital and guarantees are to represent EUR 700 billion in total. Member States’
contribution to the ESM’s capital is based on their share in the ECB’s capital134.
It is important to point out that the guarantees by the Member States are to be
pro-rate guarantees, as is the case for the EFSF. This is different from the joint
guarantees used in other EU lending instruments. As was mentioned earlier (see
4.2.2), pro-rate guarantees are a weaker form of guarantees. This explains why
the ESM’s lending capacity (EUR 500 billion) is smaller than its total capital
base (EUR 700 billion). If this were not the case, the ESM would not be able to
obtain the maximum triple A-rating.
Of the EUR 700 billion backing the ESM, EUR 80 billion will take the form of
paid-in capital, the most solid form of financial backing. The eurozone countries
will deposit this capital in five yearly tranches starting in July 2013. The rest of
the ESM’s financial backing, EUR 620 billion, takes the form of callable capital
and guarantees. The former is capital that is pledged to be provided if needed.
At any time, the Member States can decide to call upon this type of capital.
Guarantees, on the other hand, would only be made use of to meet the ESM’s
obligations to its creditors. Thus, they serve as a last resort backing. Neither the
callable capital nor the guarantees represent paid-in funds so they will not influ-
ence eurozone countries’ budgets in normal times. The paid-in capital, however,
will have an impact on the budgets of these countries.
In legal terms, a treaty among eurozone countries will set up the ESM. It is to be
an international organisation located in Luxembourg135. The ESM will not for-
mally be part of the EU. Important decisions regarding the ESM will be made
by mutual agreement of the eurozone countries’ finance ministers, i.e. no votes
against a decision. This evidently includes decisions on the available types of
financial assistance and their scope, as well as the actual provision of financial
assistance and the conditions linked to it. As a consequence, a single eurozone
134. To meet the demand of new eurozone countries, a temporary exception is provided for countries
with a GDP of less than 75% of the EU average during the first 12 years that they have joined the euro-
zone.
135. Term Sheet on the ESM, Annex II of the Conclusions of the European Council of 24-25 March
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country can block the provision of financial assistance by the ESM. This inter-
governmental nature of the ESM runs contrary to the Commission’s, Parlia-
ment’s and the ECB’s requests for a more supranational construction.
On German insistence, the ESM is to be based on a new paragraph in the EU
Treaty136. The goal is to provide a clear legal basis specific to the eurozone, as
well as to please the German constitutional court. The Treaty revision should be
completed by 2013, using the simplified revision procedure137. The Treaty revi-
sion can be undermined in two ways. First, the revision might go beyond the
simplified revision procedure, which can only be used when a revision does not
“increase the competences conferred on the Union138“. According to the Euro-
pean Council, this is not the case, but this does not mean that the European
Court of Justice necessarily shares this view. As a second potential issue, the
simplified revision procedure requires ratification by all EU Member States,
which remains hazardous139.
b. The Role of the International Monetary Fund
The IMF is to play a crucial role in financial assistance to a eurozone country,
as the ESM will seek participation from the IMF for any financial assistance it
provides. In contrast to the temporary financial assistance facility, the size of
future IMF assistance has not been detailed. Nonetheless, it can be presumed
that the IMF share in future assistance packages will be substantial, as is the case
now.
Not only will the IMF provide part of the financial assistance, the international
body will also be closely involved in the entire financial assistance process.
Together with the Commission, the IMF will play a deciding role in the decision
to grant financial assistance, the amount of assistance and the attached macro-
136. The following paragraph is to be added to Article 136 TFEU: “The Member States whose currency is
the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of
the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be
made subject to strict conditionality”. Its implications are discussed in what follows.
137. Article 48(6) of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 83, 30 March 2010, pp. 13-45.
138. Ibid.
139. Problems could arise in several countries. Public protest, both in surplus and deficit countries, may
block the permanent mechanism. In Ireland, Treaty revisions often imply a referendum. From a legal per-
spective, this does not seem strictly necessary as the revision doesn’t alter “the essential scope or objec-
tives” of the EU. Politically speaking, a referendum is not envisaged either. However, given the
consequences of the austerity measures imposed by the EU, this might change in future. See the Irish case
Crotty v. An Taoiseach, 9 April 1987 and the Statement by the Irish Prime Minister in the Irish Parlia-
ment, 22 March 2011, Retrievable on: http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Government_Press_Office/Taoi-
seach’s_Speeches_20111/Taoiseach’s_Statement_in_the_Dáil_on_European_Council,_24_25_March_
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economic reform package. It will also monitor, jointly with the Commission, the
implementation of the macro-economic reforms140.
The role of the IMF will undoubtedly have an impact on the financial assistance
provided by the eurozone. The IMF is a long-standing body and has formalised
procedures for providing financial assistance. In order to achieve IMF involve-
ment, the eurozone arm of financial assistance will have to be in line with these
procedures. This makes eurozone assistance less flexible and less autonomous.
At the same time, this allows the eurozone to rely on IMF expertise. In case the
IMF does not wish to provide financial assistance, the ESM can always provide
assistance on its own. This would, however, be a rare exception.
7.1.2. Conditionality of Financial Assistance
Financial assistance undoubtedly entails an element of solidarity. However, the
ESM is far from a simple solidarity mechanism. This is most clear when taking
into account the conditionality tied to financial assistance by the ESM. The ESM
will only provide assistance if three cumulative conditions are met. The euro-
zone countries have to agree on their fulfilment by consensus.
The first condition is that assistance must be indispensible to safeguard the sta-
bility of the eurozone as a whole. Financial assistance, then, will only be granted
because the country’s difficulties can result in problems for the rest of the euro-
zone, not simply to aid the troubled country. It will be much more difficult for
a smaller eurozone country (like Malta or Cyprus) to obtain aid than it would
be for other countries, regardless of its internal situation. This seems somewhat
discriminatory.
A second, more traditional141 condition implies that a Member State must com-
mit to a macro-economic adjustment programme in order to obtain assistance.
Such programmes aim to restore the soundness of public finances and tradition-
ally result in expenditure cuts and tax increases.
Finally, a country that requests financial assistance must be able to return to
financial health after receiving such assistance. To this purpose, a debt sustain-
ability analysis is to be carried out by the EU and the IMF. If the financial aid
140. Term Sheet on the ESM, Annex II of the Conclusions of the European Council of 24-25 March
2011, p. 26.
141. This is also the case for the EU’s balance of payment assistance to non-eurozone countries and has
been a traditional requirement for IMF loans. The IMF does, however, abandon this requirement some-
what by creating credit facilities with little conditionality (the IMF’s Flexible Credit Line).THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE MONETARY UNION?
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and the macro-economic adjustment programme are not expected to restore
financial health, the country has to work towards a debt restructuring (see 7.2).
These cumulative conditions are to deter eurozone countries from overly count-
ing on financial assistance as a way out of potential problems (in addition to the
interest surcharges, see infra). Indeed, without conditionality, appeals to finan-
cial assistance would be more probable. However, these conditions can also hold
back the disbursement of financial assistance when it is truly needed, or make it
less effective. No easy answer is available in the choice between crisis prevention
and crisis resolution.
7.1.3. Types of Financial Assistance
Only if the eurozone countries agreed that all of the aforementioned conditions
are met, can they decide on the type of financial assistance to be provided. Two
types of ESM financial assistance have been foreseen: loans and direct govern-
ment bond purchasing. Additional financial assistance instruments could be put
in place in the future.
a. Loans
The key type of financial assistance by the ESM will consist of loans. The loans,
or ESM Stability Support (ESS) as the European Council has phrased it, are to
serve as short to medium-term stability support. This implies that the loans’ time
span should not exceed 7 years142. The interest rates charged to the borrowing
country will contain a surcharge, which is both to make loans less attractive and
to finance the functioning of the ESM. The surcharge, however, will be lower
than the current lending facilities143.
Bonds held by private investors will be subordinate to ESM loans144. This
implies that in case a country would be unable to (fully) meet its debt obliga-
tions, ESM loans would be reimbursed before sovereign debt held by private
investors. This is in contrast to the current financial assistance, which does not
enjoy preferred creditor status vis-à-vis private investors. As a result, private
142. The maturities of the loans to Greece and Ireland.
143. A surcharge of 200 basis points will be required on all loans. In addition, loan amounts outstanding
after three years will be charged an additional 100 basis points. For loans of more than 3 years, the
weighted average between the surcharge for the first 3 years and the rest of the loan is used. For a six-year
loan, this means that if the ESM borrows money at 2.5%, it will lend the money to the country at a rate
of 5%. In mathematical terms, the total surcharge in basis points for loans of more than 3 years is 300-
(300/X) with a X standing for the total maturity of the loan.
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investors’ potential losses in the case of a country’s insolvency increase. This can
result in higher lending costs for some eurozone countries.
These provisions will apply from July 2013 onward, but they do already have
an effect on investor behaviour. Most of the current eurozone debt has to be
reimbursed in 2013 or later. If debt restructuring were to occur after July 2013,
such current eurozone debt would be subordinate to any aid offered by the
ESM. This increases potential losses on current public debt and pushes up the
interest rates charged by investors. To counter this problem, Member States plan
not to subordinate private debt to ESM loans for countries that received finan-
cial assistance from the temporary financial assistance facility (i.e. Greece, Ire-
land and Portugal). This exception would be maintained until these countries
are able return to normality.
b. Direct Public Bond Purchasing
As a second type of financial assistance, the ESM will be able to buy sovereign
debt directly from a eurozone country, i.e. buy it on the primary market. Such
an operation would result in a higher demand for debt emitted by the Member
State, given that the ESM’s demand comes in addition to private demand. This
reduces the interest rate charged for the debt emission. However, such an oper-
ation is likely to be controversial, as the ESM would acquire sovereign bonds
with a certain risk attached. In case of debt restructuring, the ESM would have
to bear the consequences, as it would not enjoy a preferential status on such
debt.
There are two important limits to the ESM’s means to buy government bonds.
First of all, the ESM will not be allowed to buy sovereign debt that is traded by
investors in the secondary market, which the ECB has been reluctantly been
carrying out during the sovereign debt crisis (see 4.2.3). Secondly, the ESM may
only buy debt from countries that have requested financial assistance and have
committed to an adjustment programme. As a consequence, the debt purchasing
cannot prevent financial difficulties, but can only try to limit their scope.
7.2. Debt Restructuring
Emergency financial assistance is a first important part of crisis governance.
While such assistance can serve as a means to overcome some sovereign debt
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country is not always able to restore financial health by mere financial assist-
ance. A restructuring of public debt has sometimes proven necessary145.
To take this risk into account, EU leaders have envisaged the possibility of debt
restructuring for countries whose basic solvency is questionable. As was men-
tioned earlier, (see 7.1.2), a debt sustainability analysis is to show the potential
need for restructuring a country’s public debt. If the analysis concludes that a
country is not expected to restore financial health, the country would have to
initiate discussions with its creditors on the potential restructuring of its debt. If
not, it cannot receive financial assistance.
To facilitate discussions on debt restructuring, all government bonds will have
to include so-called Collective Action Clauses (CACs) from July 2013
onwards146. By means of such clauses, bondholders can agree – by a superma-
jority – on the restructuring of all of a country’s debt. Such clauses are quite
standard in certain Anglo-Saxon countries. In continental Europe, their use has
been rare. The effects of CACs are unclear. World Bank research found that
CACs reduce the borrowing costs for countries with high credit ratings, while
costs for countries with low credit ratings rise147. The CACs might thus promote
fiscal prudence in the long run, but can pose additional problems for eurozone
countries currently facing difficulties.
It remains unclear what the lack of a debt restructuring agreement would imply
for the countries’ access to ESM aid. According to the European Council, the
Member State has to “negotiate in good faith” and demonstrate “sufficient
commitment” to achieve an agreement with private investors148. However, a
voluntary agreement on debt restructuring is not guaranteed, as bondholders
may refuse to restructure their debt on a voluntary basis. In that case, the Mem-
ber State could apply unilateral debt restructuring. The European Council has
not gone so far as to make such restructuring obligatory. It seems unlikely, how-
ever, that a normal loan would be granted if a country is probably incapable of
returning to sustainable public finances. This issue has remained unaddressed by
the EU.
145. STURZENEGGER, F., ZETTELMEYER, J., Haircuts: Estimating Investor Losses in Sovereign Debt
Restructurings,1998-2005, IMF Working Paper, 2005, WP/05/137.
146. Term Sheet on the ESM, Annex II of the Conclusions of the European Council of 24-25 March
2011, p.31
147. EICHENGREEN, B., MODY, A., Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An
Update and Additional Results, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2363, May 2000
148. See Term Sheet on the ESM, Annex II of the Conclusions of the European Council of 24-25 March
2011, p.3061
CONCLUSION
Ever since the Economic and Monetary Union was designed, it has been clear
that its foundations are uneven. The economic governance that had been put in
place was indeed unable to prevent the sovereign debt crisis. This crisis is the
most significant test of the eurozone so far and requires both a short and a long
term answer.
In the short term, it is imperative to restore the financial health of the weakened
eurozone countries. The EU’s financial assistance provided some breathing
space, but might be insufficient to actually resolve the countries’ difficulties. In
that case, more unconventional instruments, such as debt restructuring, should
be considered. In the longer term, the reform of economic governance is essen-
tial to ensure the sustainability of the monetary union. This reform is vital to
prevent future crises, but cannot resolve short term issues.
As was demonstrated in this paper, the reform of economic governance consists
of both revising existing economic governance and introducing crisis govern-
ance. Revising existing economic governance requires addressing the causes of
the fiscal and macro-economic derailments that have occurred.
In terms of fiscal sustainability, the reforms seem to go in the right direction. The
rules could, of course, be improved, notably by endowing the Commission with
more powers to verify national statistics. However, if the current rules are prop-
erly applied and sufficiently aimed at the long term, they can succeed. The suc-
cess of the rules regarding fiscal sustainability will therefore vitally depend on
the willingness of the Member States to apply them.
With regard to macro-economic convergence, success seems more difficult. The
new surveillance mechanism still needs to prove its validity. As has been argued,
it is doubtful whether the EU will be able to correctly detect macro-economic
imbalances or induce a sufficient policy response if needed. Political will to
make the macro-economic convergence rules work is again much needed, but
will not be sufficient.
Instruments focussed on the eurozone are to prevent a neglect of economic gov-
ernance as experienced before the crisis. The Euro Plus Pact is to increase euro-
zone countries’ efforts to obtain major policy objectives. Yet, the Pact contains
very few innovations, which limits its added value. More important than the
Pact are the strengthened, semi-automatic sanctions. These need to enforce the
rules regarding economic governance. This can, indeed, constitute an improve-
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were not made more gradual, as was the case for fiscal rules. By not doing so,
the EU is repeating previous mistakes. The crucial weakness of future enforce-
ment, however, is its overdependence on pecuniary sanctions. Positive incen-
tives, such as Eurobonds, have not been introduced, despite their potential
added value.
The decisions on crisis governance have led to the abandonment of the pre-crisis
no bailout rhetoric. Instead, conditional financial assistance and possible debt
restructuring are to deal with future sovereign debt crises. On condition that the
EU and the Member States are willing to effectively carry out the restructuring
of a country’s debt, crisis governance instruments should allow most crisis situ-
ations to be overcome.
Yet, the envisaged crisis governance instruments leave some issues unresolved.
We are still left wondering what the EU would do when a country repeatedly
requires EU assistance and remains unable to return to long term sustainability.
In that case, more radical solutions are needed. The eurozone could then choose
either to substantially upgrade its economic union, or to be more selective in its
membership. This implies more conditions for entering the eurozone, or even
ousting certain of its current members. Neither option is desired by the Member
States. However, an ill-functioning eurozone would, in the long run, be at least
as detrimental, both for the weaker and the stronger members.
Finally, the EU and its Member States must not forget that what ultimately mat-
ters most is the support and confidence of the EU citizens. The public opinions
within the eurozone, including the stronger and weaker countries, need to be
convinced of the benefits of the single currency and the common destiny it
entails. If this is the case, a thriving monetary union is within reach. If not, future
crises are unavoidable.